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Exclusion of Patrons and
Horsemen From Racetracks:
A Legal, Practical and
Constitutional Dilemma
By JOHN J. KROPP,*
J. JEFFREY LANDEN** AND
MONICA A. DoNATH***
INTRODUCTION
Racetracks frequently confront a problem that has produced
heated legal controversies for well over one hundred years: the
need to exclude or eject individual patrons and horsemen' from
racetrack premises. 2 The underlying theme is frequently that the
racetrack 3 or the state regulatory body responsible for the su-
* Partner in the firm of Graydon, Head & Ritchey, Cincinnati, Ohio. B.A. 1969,
University of Cincinnati; J.D. 1972, Georgetown University.
** Associate in the firm of Graydon, Head & Ritchey, Cincinnati, Ohio. B.A.
1978, Centre College; J.D. 1982, University of Kentucky.
*** Associate in the firm of Graydon, Head & Ritchey, Cincinnati, Ohio. B.A.
1982, Duke University; J.D. 1985, University of Cincinnati.
I For purposes of this Article, the term horsemen means persons who are horse
owners, trainers, jockeys or racing commission licensees.
2 The first reported decision in Anglo-American jurisprudence focusing on the
exclusion or ejection of a racetrack patron appears to be Wood v. Leadbitter, 153 Eng.
Rep. 351 (Ex. 1845). See notes 19-27 infra and accompanying text.
Racetracks throughout the United States are generally privately owned and
operated under a state-granted license or permit. For a discussion of the private character
of race courses, see notes 56 and 72 infra. Depending upon the vocabulary adopted by
the state regulatory authority, the racetrack may be known as a "racetrack," a "racing
association," or by other terms. See, e.g., PENNSYLVANIA Rulms OF RAciNG § 163.310
(1985) ("race track"); Soutm DAKOTA RuLEs AND REGULATIONS GOvERNING HORSE
RACING AND HORSE RAcING MEETINGS, R. 20.04:19 (1985) ("racing associations").
Generally, these differences in terminology are of no substantive significance, and this
Article considers all such terms interchangeable.
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pervision of horse racing4 attempts to exclude persons whose
presence at the track is not in the best interests of the sport of
racing.5 Some of the activities giving rise to exclusion or ejection
of an individual, such as intoxication or violent conduct, are
not directly related to the sport. 6 Others, such as bookmaking,
race fixing or the illegal drugging of horses to improve their
performance,7 are the perennial scourges of the horse racing
industry.
In response to these and other problems, the courts devel-
oped the racetrack's common law right of exclusion, permitting
track management to exclude patrons or horsemen from the
premises for just cause or for no reason at all." Subsequently,
legislatures and racing commissions of many states approved
statutes and regulations 9 that permit the racetrack, the racing
4 In most states, the supervision of thoroughbred horse racing is vested by state
law in an administrative body designated as a racing commission or a racing board. See,
e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 8, § 37-2 (Smith-Hurd 1985) (creating the Illinois Racing
Board); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 230.220 (Bobbs-Merrill 1982) [hereinafter cited as KRS]
(creating the Kentucky State Racing Commission). In several states, there are separate
commissions or boards for types of racing other than thoroughbred racing. See, e.g.,
KRS § 230.413 (1982) (creating the Kentucky Quarter Horse and Appaloosa Commis-
sion); KRS § 230.620 (1982) (creating the Kentucky Harness Racing Commission). This
Article uses the terms board and commission interchangeably. Unless otherwise specified,
the terms refer to the state administrative entity with authority to supervise thoroughbred
horse racing within the jurisdiction.
See notes 97-107, 129-43, and 154-62 infra and accompanying text for a general
discussion of the standards applicable to racetracks and racing commissions in the
exclusion of patrons and horsemen from racetrack premises.
6 See notes 158-60 infra and accompanying text.
7 See notes 154-62 infra and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Marrone v. Washington Jockey Club, 227 U.S. 633, 636 (1913) ("the
rule commonly accepted in this country from the English cases"); 153 Eng. Rep. 351
(English law).
9 A review of the complete panorama of state statutory and regulatory restrictions
on the horse racing industry is beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say that
the state-imposed requirements on racing and pari-mutuel wagering, even within a single
jurisdiction, are indeed extensive. See, e.g., KRS §§ 230.070-.090 (general provisions);
KRS §§ 230.210-.360 (racing); KRS §§ 230.361-.374 (pari-mutuel wagering); KRS §§
230.385-.398 (pari-mutuel wagering for harness racing); KRS § 230.400 (Thoroughbred
Development Fund); KRS §§ 230.410-.447 (quarter horse and appaloosa racing); KRS
§§ 230.510-.520 (Kentucky Horse Council); KRS §§ 230.610-.770 (trotting and harness
racing); Kentucky Rules of Racing, 810 Ky. ADMIN. REos. § 1:001-:021 (1985) [herein-
after cited as K.A.R.].
The rules of racing in many states are codified along with the other administrative
regulations promulgated by state agencies. See, e.g., 810 K.A.R. § 1:001 et seq. In some
1985-86] EXCLUSION FROM RACETRACKS
commission, or both to exclude or eject individual patrons and
horsemen from the premises)10 In several states, including Ken-
tucky," the common law right of exclusion and a statutory or
regulatory authorization 2 or mandate 3 to exclude certain indi-
viduals coexist, 4 so that at least two independent sources for
the track's authority to exclude or eject may be relevant to any
given situation. Increasingly, however, both the common law
right and the statutory and regulatory provisions relating to
exclusion have been subjected to legal and constitutional chal-
lenges.
This Article examines the sources of the common law right
of exclusion' s and surveys the statutory and regulatory provisions
adopted by many states. Various challenges to the application
of these rights of exclusion are scrutinized, 6 and the rights of
jurisdictions, however, the rules of racing are not so codified. The racing commission
of the various states, including those with codified rules of racing, publish separate
pamphlet editions of the regulations containing the codified and, if applicable, uncodified
material. See, e.g., KENTUCKY Rusrs OF RACING (1984). Frequently, the numbering
system in these unofficial compilations differs from the official codification. Compare
id. (regulations I - XX) with 810 K.A.R. § 1:001-.021. As a practical matter, most
attorneys practicing in the area of equine racing law refer to the rules and regulations
by using the state racing commission's numbering system rather than the codified
citation. Therefore, for ease of reference, throughout this Article citations to the state
rules and regulations governing racing will give the name of the state, the number of
the rule or regulation from that state's unofficial pamphlet edition of its racing regula-
tions, and the pamphlet edition year of publication. E.g., "KENTUCKY RuLEs OF RACING,
R. 1 (1984)."
See notes 96-113, 144-76 infra and accompanying text.
See James v. Churchill Downs, Inc., 620 S.W.2d 323 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
12 Some statutes and regulations permissively authorize the racetrack or the racing
commission to exclude certain persons from the track, without requiring the track to
exclude anyone. See, e.g., KENTUCKY RuLss OF RACING, R. VI, § 23(1) (1984) ("Asso-
ciations may eject or exclude any persons, licensed or unlicensed, from association
grounds or a part thereof solely of its own volition and without any reason or excuse
given therefor .... ).
" Some regulations require the track to exclude or expel certain described cate-
gories of persons from its premises. See, e.g., KENTUCKY RuLEs OF RACING, R. VI, §
23(2) (1984) ("Association shall eject or exclude from association grounds all persons
believed to be engaged in a bookmaking activity or solicitation [sic] of bets or touting
... ."). Cf. KENTUCKY RuLEs OF RACING, R. VI, § 23(1) (1984).
14 See, e.g., Tropical Park, Inc. v. Jock, 374 So. 2d 639 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)
(statute preempts common law right to exclude only in the areas designated by statute);
James v. Churchill Downs, Inc., 620 S.W.2d 323 (for the statute to abrogate the common
law, the intention to do so must be clear).
11 See notes 19-42, 47-95, 129-42 infra and accompanying text.
16 See notes 96-113, 144-77 infra and accompanying text.
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the racetrack are examined both in terms of the need for such
powers of exclusion and their ability to withstand legal and
constitutional attack.'7 This analysis leads to the conclusion that
many of the statutory and regulatory provisions currently in
force need updating so that racetracks may exclude certain in-
dividuals without fear of legal or constitutional challenge.' 8
I. SOURCES OF AUTHORITY FOR THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE
A. The Common Law Right of Exclusion
In 1845, an English court for the first time examined the
right of a racetrack to exclude a patron. In Wood v. Leadbitter,9
an action for assault and false imprisonment, the plaintiff pur-
chased a ticket to sit in the grandstand at the Doncaster races,
and subsequently was asked to leave the premises by a servant
of Lord Eglintoun, the steward of those races.20 After refusing
to leave, the plaintiff was taken by the arm and forced to leave
without the use of "unnecessary violence. ' 2' The case reporter
noted that Lord Eglintoun wanted the plaintiff to leave "in
consequence of some alleged malpractices of his on a former
" See notes 86-95 infra and accompanying text.
" See text accompanying note 219 infra.
19 153 Eng. Rep. 351 (Ex. 1845).
10 Id. at 351. "[T]ickets of admission to the Grand Stand were issued ... and
sold for a guinea each, entitling the holders to come into the stand, and the inclosure
round it, during the races." Id.
21 Id. at 352. "It must be assumed that the plaintiff had in no respect misconducted
himself, and that, if he had not been required to depart, his coming upon and remaining
in the inclosure would have been an act justified by his purchase of the ticket." Id. at
353.
Many cases recite that the exclusion or expulsion at issue was accomplished without
unnecessary violence and that the person ejected was, but for the racetrack's right of
exclusion, properly within-or seeking to enter-the racetrack. Thus, the reader may
assume in this Article, like the court in Wood, that unless the contrary is stated, in each
instance the person ejected was otherwise properly on the racetrack premises and that
the ejection did not involve the use of undue violence. For a discussion of the limits of
force that may generally be used in ejecting a trespasser, see 87 C.J.S. Trespass § 45b
(1954).
For purposes of this Article, one may assume also that, unless otherwise stated,
the ejected person's conduct would not otherwise have subjected him to arrest. The
expulsion of a patron or a horseman from racetrack premises that is merely incidental
to a lawful arrest is beyond the scope of this Article.
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occasion, connected with the turf," 22 but neither the reporter's
notes nor the judge's decision gives any hint as to the nature of
the "alleged malpractices."' 2 The guinea that the plaintiff had
paid to get into the races was not returned.24
The legal analysis paved the way for a century of decisions:
the court considered the situation a real estate case. In the
judge's view, the plaintiff had purchased a license to go on the
racing grounds. Classifying the ticket as a license rather than a
grant under real estate principles, the court concluded that the
ticket was revocable. According to the court, the ticket did not
constitute a grant, because the ticket was not "under seal," as
legally required at that time for any transfer of an incorporeal
right affecting land. Although the court noted in dicta that the
plaintiff might have a right of action against the seller of the
ticket, "any such action would be founded on a breach of
contract, and would not be the result of his having acquired by
the ticket a right of going upon the stand, in spite of the owner
of the soil."26 The plaintiff's claim to get his guinea back might
be valid, but the "owner of the soil" had the right to expel the
plaintiff as a matter of real estate law. According to the learned
judge, "the ancient landmarks of the common law' 27 compelled
such an analysis.
Although American courts would cling to Wood as an im-
portant precedent, English courts ironically did not hold it in
such high esteem. Seventy years later, in Hurst v. Picture The-
atres, Ltd.,28 the King's Bench Division of the High Court of
Justice concluded that Wood was no longer good law. 29 Hurst
153 Eng. Rep. at 352.
" See id. at 351-59. See notes 144-76 infra and accompanying text for a discussion
of the grounds for exclusion of horsemen under modem statutes and regulations, many
of which relate to former "turf" offenses.
Id. at 353.
:' Id. at 358-59. See Hurst v. Picture Theatres, Ltd., [1914-15] All E.R. 836, 838-
39 (explaining the holding in Wood).
153 Eng. Rep. at 359.
Id. at 358-59.
[1914-15] All E.R. 836.
" Id. at 838-40 (opinion of Buckley, L.J.); id. at 842-43 (opinion of Kennedy,
L.J.). Hurst has been cited to courts in the United States to show that Wood, the
foundation of the common law right, is unsound. See, e.g., Greenfeld v. Maryland
Jockey Club, 57 A.2d 335, 336-37 (Md. 1948). Such arguments have been rejected. See,
e.g., id. at 337.
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involved a movie theatre patron whom management ejected in
the mistaken belief that the customer had not paid for his seat.30
The Hurst court noted that, even if Wood v. Leadbitter were
still good law, the patron should prevail because the patron was
not buying a revocable interest in a portion of the theatre, but
a right to see the movie:
What is the grant [in this case]? What the plaintiff in the
present action paid his money for was to enjoy the sight of a
particular spectacle. He was anxious to go into a picture theatre
to see a series of moving pictures during an hour or a couple
of hours .... That which was granted to him ... was the
right ... to attend a performance from its beginning to its
end. That which was called the licence, the right to go upon
the premises, was only something granted to him for the pur-
pose of enabling him to enjoy that which had been granted
him-namely, the right to see. He could not see the perform-
ance unless he went into the building .... So that here ...
there was a licence coupled with a grant ... [and a] licence
coupled with a grant is not revocable.3'
The Hurst court's interpretation of the realities of the situation
seems accurate, for, when he buys his ticket, the patron of any
type of entertainment-be it an opera, a movie or a horse race-
is almost certainly thinking of the amusement itself rather than
his right to occupy a few square feet of the premises.
Hurst also suggests an alternate way to defeat the Wood
analysis. After the merging of equity and law in the English
court system, 32 the Wood rationale was no longer valid because
a "modern" court could find that, even if the license to enter
" [1914-15] All E.R. at 837.
Id. at 839.
" The court stated:
According to Wood v. Leadbitter ... the plaintiff would have been
dismissed from a court of law; he would have no case. He comes into a
court of equity, and he obtains relief in equity.
.... The position of matters now is that the Court is bound under
the Judicature Act to give effect to equitable doctrines.
Id. at 840 (discussing Frogley v. Earl of Lovelace, [18591 70 E.R. 450, 453). For a
discussion of the effect of civil rights legislation on the common law right of exclusion
in the United States, see notes 86-95 infra and accompanying text.
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the premises were revocable at law because it was not under
seal, in equity the plaintiff would be entitled to an injunction
restraining the owner of the premises from breaching his contract
with the patron by revoking the license. 33 A court could also
find that the license to allow the patron to enter and see the
entertainment is coupled with an implied contract not to revoke
the license until the end of the performance.3 4
Thus, in the country where it was rendered, Wood is no
longer entitled to deference, and its views on the racetrack/
patron relationship have been refuted. In the United States,
however, Wood and its progeny maintain a remarkable vitality.
Wood has attained wide acceptance in the United States, due
in large part to its citation by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in
the United States Supreme Court decision Marrone v. Washing-
ton Jockey Club.35 Marrone purchased a ticket of admission to
Bennings Race Track in Washington, D.C., but was not permit-
ted to enter the track, apparently because the track management
believed that he had " 'doped' or drugged a horse entered by
him for a race a few days before. ' 36 Marrone brought a trespass
action based upon the management's forcible prevention of his
" [1914-15] All E.R. at 840-41. In Hurst, an injunction was not actually granted;
the plaintiff was allowed to recover damages. Id. at 841. As a practical matter, obtaining
an injunction before the exclusion in most instances would be virtually impossible. The
Hurst court did not so much suggest that the plaintiff actually should get an injunction,
but used the premise that the theatre owner's conduct would be enjoinable to reach the
conclusion that the patron's license was irrevocable.
Nevertheless, the Hurst rationale that the plaintiff could or should be entitled to
an injunction restraining the proprietors from breaching the contract by revoking the
license may apply with greater force in the context of horse racing than in the Hurst
movie theatre situation. Presumably, the movie would be shown again at other times
and on other days, making it difficult for the patron to demonstrate irreparable harm.
See, e.g., FED. R. Clv. P. 65(b). But in the horse racing context, if the patron or
horseman wanted to see or to participate in a given race and were prevented from doing
so by his exclusion from the track, he would never again be able personally to witness
or to participate in that race, suggesting a truly "irreparable injury" that could justify
equitable relief. See, e.g., Bier v. Fleming, 538 F. Supp. 437, 441 (N.D. Ohio 1981),
revd. on other grounds, 717 F.2d 308 (6th Cir. 1983) (citing earlier proceeding in which
the plaintiff harness driver/trainer was granted a temporary restraining order permitting
him to drive harness horses at Northfield Park).
See [1914-15] All E.R. at 841.
227 U.S. 633 (1913).
Id. at 636.
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entry into the racetrack, and alleged that the Washington Jockey
Club had conspired to destroy his reputation. 37
Justice Holmes noted that there was no evidence of any
conspiracy and that the track management had used no more
force than necessary to keep the plaintiff from entering the
racetrack.38 As to the propriety of excluding Marrone, Justice
Holmes's analysis paralleled that used by the English court in
Wood:
[The plaintiff s] argument hardly went beyond an attempt to
overthrow the rule commonly accepted in this country from
the English cases, and adopted below, that such tickets do not
create a right in rem....
We see no reason for declining to follow the commonly
accepted rule. The fact that the purchase of the ticket made a
contract is not enough. A contract binds the person of the
maker but does not create an interest in the property that it
may concern, unless it also operates as a conveyance. The
ticket was not a conveyance of an interest in the race track,
not only because it was not under seal but because by common
understanding it did not purport to have that effect. There
would be obvious inconveniences if it were construed other-
wise.... [T]he holder had no right to enforce specific per-
formance by self-help. His only right was to sue upon the
contract for the breach. It is true that if the contract were
incidental to a right of property either in the land or in goods
upon the land, there might be an irrevocable right of entry,
but when the contract stands by itself it must either be a
conveyance or a license subject to be revoked. 39
The wording varies slightly from that used by the Wood court,
but the analysis from a real estate perspective, characterizing the
ticket as a revocable license, is virtually identical.40
37 Id.
38 Id.
19 Id. at 636-37 (citing Johnson v. Wilkinson, 29 N.E. 62 (Mass. 1885); McCrea
v. Marsh, 12 Gray 211 (Mass. 1857); Meisher v. Detroit B.I. & W. Ferry Co., 118 N.W.
14 (Mich. 1908); Schubert v. Nixon, 83 A. 369 (N.J. 1912); People ex. rel. Burnham v.
Flynn, 82 N.E. 167 (N.Y. 1907); Taylor v. Cohn, 84 P. 388 (Or. 1906); Homey v.
Nixon, 61 A. 1088 (Pa. 1905); N.W.V. Co. v. Black, 75 S.E. 82, 85 (Va. 1912); 153
Eng. Rep. 351).
41 See 153 Eng. Rep. 351. Two years after the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Marrone, Wood was overruled by Hurst. See notes 28-34 supra and accom-
panying text for a discussion of Hurst.
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The principles set forth in Wood and Marrone have become
the majority rule in the United States. 4' Although both decisions
dealt with racetrack situations, courts have applied the same
reasoning to other situations, such as theatres and other places
of public amusement. 42
B. Statutes and Regulations
Adding to or modifying the common law right of exclusion,
many jurisdictions have enacted statutes43 or promulgated rules
and regulations" pertaining to the exclusion of individual pa-
41 See, e.g., Watkins v. Oaklawn Jockey Club, 86 F. Supp. 1006, 1016 (W.D.
Ark. 1949), aff'd, 183 F.2d 440 (8th Cir. 1950); Flores v. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc.,
361 P.2d 921, 924 (Cal. 1961); Silbert v. Ramsey, 482 A.2d 147, 150 (Md. 1984); 57
A.2d 335 at 336 (Md. 1948); Garifine v. Monmouth Park Jockey Club, 148 A.2d 1, 5-
6 (N.J. 1959); Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, 72 N.E.2d 697, 698 (N.Y.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947). See also Tropical Park, Inc. v. Jock, 374 So. 2d 639, 640
(Fla. 1979) (citing Madden); James v. Churchill Downs, Inc., 620 S.W.2d 323 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1981) (citing Rodic v. Thistledown, 615 F.2d 736 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
996 (1980)).
,1 See, e.g., Capital Theatre Co. v. Compton, 54 S.W.2d 620, 621 (Ky. 1932);
Shubert v. Nixon Amusement Co., 83 A. 369, 371 (N.J. 1912). As recently as 1984, the
Maryland Court of Appeals followed Wood and Marrone in Silbert v. Ramsey, 482
A.2d 147 (Md. 1984), recognizing that the license granting access to the racetrack's
premises is revocable. Although the court did not explicitly say so, one may infer from
the language of the Silbert decision that the proprietor has a right to exclude a patron
at his whim. See id. at 150.
" See, e.g., KRS §§ 230.070-.990 (1982); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3769.01-.99
(Baldwin 1985).
" See, e.g., ARIZONA HORSE RACING RULES AND REGULATIONS, R. 4-27-121(E)(3)(f)
(1983); RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING HORSE RACING IN ARKANSAS, Regulations
1247-50 (1985); CALIFORNIA HORSE RACING BOARD RULES AND REGULATIONs, R. 1528
(1984); COLORADO GENERAL RUtES OF RACING FOR GREYHOUND AND HORSE RACE MEETS,
R. 3.01-.02 (1982); DELAWARE STATE HARNESS RACING CoiMM'N RULES AND REGULATIONS
R. 5 § 21(k) (1978); FLORIDA HARNESS RACING RU.ES & REGULATIONS R. 7E-4.01(12),
R. 7E-4.09, R.7E-4.28 (1984); IDAHO RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR HORSE RACING AND
HORSE RACING MEETINGS R. 343 (1984); ILLINOIS RACING BOARD RULES AND REGULATIONS
OF HARNESS RACING R. 3.02 (1985); IOWA STATE RACING COM'N RU..S OF HARNESS
RACING R. 693-9.165 (99D) (1984); KENTUCKY RULES OF RACING R. VI § 23.& R. XIX
§§ 1 & 2 (1984); LOUISIANA STATE RACING COMM'N RULES OF RACING R. 1.16 (1984);
RULES AND REGULATIONS OF MAINE STATE HARNESS RACING COMo'N Ch. 22(4) (1981);
MARYLAND RACING COMM'N THOROUGHBRED RULES R. 10.01.45(x) (1984); MASSACHU-
sarns STATE RACING CoMM'N RULEs OF HORSE RACING R. 4.44(12) (1985); MICHIGAN
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE RACING COMM'N GENER.AL RULES OF RACING R. 431.1005(b),
.1130 (1985); MINNESOTA RACING RULES R. 7897.0120(2) (1985); MONTANA BOARD OF
HORSE RACING LAW AND RULES R. 23-4-202(2) (1985); NEBRASKA RU.Es OF RACING Ch.
1985-861
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trons, horsemen, or both from racetrack premises. The statutes
and regulations differ widely among jurisdictions45 and, in light
of the pre-existing common law right, the effects that they have
on the-right of exclusion are not altogether clear. The common
law right and the statutory and regulatory provisions governing
exclusion within a given jurisdiction tend to become intertwined
when applied. Furthermore, the analysis of the rules of exclusion
must consider the distinction between a patron and a horseman,4
adding still further complexity.
II. EXCLUSION OF PATRONS
Under common law, anyone engaged in a public calling,
such as an innkeeper or a common carrier, had a duty to the
general public and was required to serve without discrimination
all who sought service. 47 In contrast, the proprietors of private
enterprises, including places of amusement such as theatres and
racetracks, were under no such restriction and could generally
6.003 (1984); NEVADA RACING Comm'N REGULATIONS GOVERNING HORSE RACING R.
466.010(15) (1980); NEW JERSEY RACING Co?,R.I'N RULES AND REGULATIONS OF HARNESS
RACING R. 13:71-3.2, -5.3 (1982); RU.S GoVERNING HORSE RACING IN NEW MExico R.
41.01 (1981); NEW YoRK RACING AND WAGERING BOARD DIVSION OF RACING RULES AND
REGULATIONS R. 4119.8 (1983); Omo RULES AND REGULATIONS R. 3769-4-28 (1985);
OKLA.OA HORSE RACING COI.D.'N RULES OF RACING R. 104 (1985); OREbON RACING
COMM'N Rums OF HORSE RACING R. 462-37-005(4) (1985); OREGON PARI-MUTuEL RULES
AND REGULATIONS R. 462.080 (1985); PENNSYLVANIA STATE HORSE RACING COmM'N RULES
OF RACING § 163.340(g) (1984); SOUTH DAKOTA RtLES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING
HORSE RACING AND HORSE RACING MEETINGS R. 20:04:17:06 (1983); WAsHINGTON HORSE
RACING COM, a'N RULES OF RACING R. 260-84-060 (1984); WEST VIRGINIA RULS OF RACING
R. 362 (1985); WYoiNG RULES OF RACING AND PARI-MTUEL EVENTS § 3(s) (1983).
4 Compare CALIFORNIA HORSE RACING BOARD RULES AND REGULATIONS § 19S2
(1984) (requiring that all persons ejected or excluded be notified of the reason for the
ejection or exclusion and be notified of appeal procedures) with IDAHO RULES AND
REGULATIONS FOR HORSE RACING AND HORSE RACING MEETINGS (1984) (making no
provision whatsoever that ejected persons be notified of the reason for their ejection or
be notified of appeal procedures).
46 See notes 47-128 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the exclusion
of racetrack patrons. See notes 129-76 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of
the exclusion of licensed horseman.
4' Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, Inc., 72 N.E.2d 697, 698 (N.Y.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947). See Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 275-79 (1963)
(Douglas, J., concurring); Greenfeld v. Maryland Jockey Club, 57 A.2d 335, 337 (Md.
1948).
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exclude anyone at their sole discretion,48 even if the patron had
gained admittance to the facility and was later ejected. 49
A. The Common Law Right
Because a racetrack is not a public enterprise, the right under
common law to eject or exclude a patron without cause is well
established. 0 In often-cited Madden v. Queens County Jockey
Club,' the plaintiff "Coley" Madden, a "patron of the races,"
was mistaken for Owney Madden, a bookmaker. Believing he
was the bookmaker, Aqueduct Race Track management erro-
neously excluded Coley. The plaintiff obtained an injunction
compelling the racetrack to allow him on its premises. The trial
court found that because the plaintiff was a citizen of good
repute and willing to pay the required admission price, he should
be admitted to the racetrack's grounds.5 2
" Nation v. Apache Greyhound Park, 579 P.2d 580, 581 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978);
Tamelleo v. New Hampshire Jockey Club, Inc., 163 A.2d 10, 11-12 (N.H. 1960); 72
N.E.2d at 698 (N.Y. 1947). See Salmore v. Empire City Racing Ass'n, 123 N.Y.S.2d
688, 692 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953) ("The operation of a race track does not constitute the
performance of a public function."); Woollcott v. Shubert, 111 N.E. 829, 830 (N.Y.
1916) ("At the common law a theatre ... is in no sense public property or a public
enterprise.").
" See 57 A.2d at 336. It is clear that pre-admittance exclusion is treated the same
as an ejection from the racetrack grounds. See id. Thus, although an individual obtains
a ticket and gains admittance, he does not have any greater right than the person who
is refused the opportunity to purchase a ticket or fals to make it into the racetrack.
See 579 P.2d at 580-81. Exclusion and ejection are therefore considered identical in
theory for purposes of this Article.
;' See, e.g., Watkins v. Oaklawn Jockey Club, 86 F. Supp. 1006, 1016 (W.D.
Ark. 1949), aff'd, 183 F.2d 440 (8th Cir. 1950); Flores v. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc.,
361 P.2d 921, 924 (Cal. 1961); Tropical Park, Inc. v. Jock, 374 So. 2d 639, 640 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1979); James v. Churchill Downs, Inc., 620 S.W.2d 323, 324-25 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1981); Silbert v. Ramsey, 482 A.2d 147, 149 (Md. 1984); Greenfeld v. Maryland
Jockey Club, 57 A.2d at 337; Tamelleo v. New Hampshire Jockey Club, Inc., 163 A.2d
at 11-12; Marzocca v. Ferone, 461 A.2d 1133, 1136-38 (N.J. 1983); Garifine v. Mon-
mouth Park Jockey Club, 148 A.2d 1, 3-6 (N.J. 1959); People v. Licata, 320 N.Y.S.2d
53, 55 (N.Y. 1971); Madden v. Queens Jockey Club, 72 N.E.2d at 698; Presti v. New
York Racing Ass'n, 363 N.Y.S.2d 24, 26-27 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975); Vaintraub v. New
York Racing Ass'n, 280 N.Y.S.2d 758, 759 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967); Gottlieb v. Sullivan
County Harness Racing Ass'n, 269 N.Y.S.2d 314, 316 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966). See Rodie
v. Thistledown, 615 F.2d 736 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 996 (1980); Nation v.
Apache Greyhound Park, Inc., 579 P.2d at 581; Capital Theatre Co. v. Compton, 54
S.W.2d 620, 621 (Ky. 1932).
72 N.E.2d 697 (N.Y. 1947).
Id. at 697-98.
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The New York Court of Appeals ultimately reversed the
decision,-3 in part on the basis that a racetrack proprietor is not
obligated to the general public, and thus the common law right
of exclusion prevails . 4 The court ruled for the racetrack even
though the racetrack proprietors had clearly excluded a person
who was "a citizen of good repute and standing. ' ' s According
to the court, a racetrack-like other places of amusement-
enjoys "an absolute power to serve whom they please. "56
The absolute right to exclude a patron from a racetrack is
found in the majority of states that have addressed the ques-
tion.5 7 The New Jersey Supreme Court, in Garifine v. Monmouth
Park Jockey Club,58 initially followed the majority rule in de-
nying the plaintiff's attack on the common law doctrine of the
absolute right of exclusion. 9 The plaintiff in Garifine wanted
the court to require the racetrack to produce evidence sufficient
to establish "good cause" for his exclusion.60 Although the
" Id. at 700. The appellate division reversed the trial court, and the court of
appeals affirmed the appellate division. Id. at 698, 700.
14 Id. at 698-99.
" Id. at 698.
Id. (emphasis added). This "absolute" right is limited only by any constitution-
ally or statutorily imposed requirements that alter the common law. See id.
In Madden, for example, the court noted that, in New York, "a statute-explicitly
covering 'race courses'-limits the power by prohibiting discrimination on account of
race, creed, color or national origin.... That, then, is the measure of the restriction."
Id. Many, if not all, jurisdictions have adopted some form of civil rights statute dealing
with racial and religious discrimination based on the federal model. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000(a) (1982). Racial or religious discrimination may constitute a violation of such a
civil rights provision, if the civil rights legislation is sufficiently broad in its coverage,
without affecting the racetrack's general right to exclude individual patrons for any
other reason. But cf. 57 A.2d at 337 ("except in cases of common carriers, innkeepers
and similar public callings, one may choose his customers") (emphasis added) with 482
A.2d at 150-51 ("Greenfeld is consistent with the majority of case law which has upheld
the proprietor's right to exclude"; but "[a]ppellee concedes that a race-track is a place
of public accommodation" as that term is used in the civil rights legislation) (emphasis
added).
" See, e.g., 86 F. Supp. at 1016; 361 P.2d at 924; 374 So. 2d at 640; 620 S.W.2d
at 324-25; 57 A.2d at 337; 163 A.2d at 12; 148 A.2d at 6; 320 N.Y.S.2d at 55; 72
N.E.2d at 698; 363 N.Y.S.2d at 26-27; 280 N.Y.S.2d at 759; 269 N.Y.S.2d at 316. See
also 615 F.2d 736; 579 P.2d at 581; 54 S.W.2d at 621. But see 461 A.2d at 1136-38.
See notes 64-72 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of Marzocca.
Is 148 A.2d at 5-6.
19 Id. at 6.
0 Id. "The burden of the plaintiff's present attack is on the common-law doctrine
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racetrack had informed the plaintiff that he was "an undesirable,
and that his general record and reputation warrant[ed] his exclu-
sion,"16' the court explicitly stated that there was no reason to
alter the common law doctrine granting the racetrack the abso-
lute right to exclude a patron. The court observed in dicta,
however, that the defendant did not challenge the racetrack's
good faith or sound purposes, and that because there were not
"any urgent considerations of justice or policy," 62 no reason
existed to depart from the common law right of a racetrack to
"exclude suspected undesirables."63 This dicta has complicated
the right of exclusion issue in subsequent decisions.
In Marzocca v. Ferrone,64 the Superior Court of New Jersey
departed from the absolute right of exclusion stated in Garifine.
Rather than the exclusion of a patron, Marzocca involved the
exclusion of a horse owned by the plaintiff, a licensed 65 owner,
from racing at Freehold Raceway. The plaintiff had been racing
his horses at the defendant's racetrack, but wanted to race his
horse, Lord John C, at another racetrack. 6 The racetrack's
racing secretary67 did not want Lord John C to leave the race-
track because the horse was needed to complete a field of horses
within a certain category.68 The plaintiff, in spite of the racing
which he states should be altered to afford him a right of admission to the race track
in the absence of affirmative legal proof by the defendant that there is good cause for
his exclusion." Id.
6 Id. at 2.
Id. at 6.
' ld.
' 453 A.2d 228 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1982), rev'd in part, 461 A.2d 1133 (N.J. 1983).
" In all jurisdictions where racing is permitted, the state's racing commission has
the authority to license those individuals who work on the track or own horses. After
an application is approved, a license is issued that permits the individual to participate
in that state's racing activity. See J. LoImIMM & A. KIRKPATRICK, SUCCESSFUL THOR-
OUGHBRED INVESTMENT IN A CHANom MARKET 73 (1984) [hereinafter referred to as
LoimAN & KIRKPATRICK]. See, e.g., KENTUCKY RULES OF RACING R. VII, § 1 (1984)
(license required).
453 A.2d at 229.
Every racetrack has a racing secretary whose job is to organize a complete racing
program. Losmt, & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 84, at 55. The racing secretary must
therefore design a racing program that fits the horses that will run at his racetrack. Id.
1- 453 A.2d at 230. At most racetracks, five categories of races are run; they
include stakes races, handicap races, allowance races, maiden races and claiming races.
See LolmAN & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 65, at 43-45. The racing secretary apparently
needed Lord John C for $15,000 claiming races, because he "consistently had extreme
difficulty filling races." 453 A.2d at 230.
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secretary's warnings that if Lord John C left the racetrack, he
would not be permitted to return, removed the horse and raced
him at another course.6 9 The racing secretary barred the plaintiff
from entering Lord John C in any subsequent races at the
racetrack, but permitted the plaintiff to stable and race other
horses at the racetrack.70
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court, citing Garifine,
recognized the racetrack's common law right of exclusion.7' The
court indicated that the exclusion rule established in Garifine
was controlling, but that the right should be limited by prohibit-
ing exclusions that violated public policy. Finding no competing
public policy issues, the court upheld the racetrack's exclusion
of Lord John C from racing at Freehold Raceway.72
The New Jersey decisions discuss the need to grant the public
"reasonable access" to private property opened to the public, 3
and the dicta in Marzocca may undermine the common law right
to exclude a patron. 74 Nevertheless, as recently as 1984, the
Maryland Court of Appeals, in Silbert v. Ramsey,75 examined
the New Jersey decisions, but reaffirmed the common law right
of a racetrack to exclude a patron without considering the sup-
posed public right of reasonable access and without balancing
6 453 A.2d at 229.
70 See 461 A.2d at 1135.
7 Id. at 1136 (citing 148 A.2d 1).
72 461 A.2d at 1137-38. A close examination of the Marzocca decision sheds some
light on its apparent conflict with the same court's dicta in Uston v. Resorts Int'l Hotel,
Inc., 445 A.2d 370 (N.J. 1982).
In dicta, the Uston court stated that the common law right of an amusement
owner to exclude unwanted patrons had to be balanced against the competing interest
of the patron in having reasonable access to private property once that property has
been opened to the public. Id. at 375. Although Marzocca apparently does not ultimately
decide the status of the right of exclusion in the patron context, it does intimate that-
if asked to reach that issue-the New Jersey Supreme Court would limit the common
law right of exclusion and require that the competing interests of the property owner
and the patron be weighed. In contrast, an owner racing his horses at a New Jersey
racetrack would be considered to be in a business relationship with the racetrack, and
the court would not interfere with the racetrack's decision to exclude such a horseman
unless the exclusion violated public policy.
71 Id. See note 56 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the status of
racetracks as public accomodations under civil rights statutes.
4 461 A.2d at 1137.
• 482 A.2d 147 (Md. 1984).
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the interests of the racetrack and the patron. 76 Although the
court found that the racetrack had the common law right to
exclude the patron, one should note that the patron had been
previously convicted of violating lottery laws, 77 a fact that per-
haps influenced the court's decision. 78
Often the patron in exclusion cases is an "undesirable" from
the racetrack's perspective.79 There are, however, decisions such
as Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club"0 and Greenfeld v.
Maryland Jockey Clubs' in which the common law absolute right
of exclusion permitted either ejection or exclusion of a patron
from a racetrack, although there was no evidence that the patron
possessed any "undesirable" characteristics 2 The New Jersey
Supreme Court in Garifine explained the rationale for the race-
track's common law right to exclude any patron without cause:
[The track is] in the position to assert more than the traditional
common-law right of the private entrepreneur to choose his
patrons; its business admittedly tended to attract many unde-
sirables who could freely roam about its premises, and it was
well-advised to be on the lookout for them and to bar them
whenever possible. It would seem rather unwise to deter its
cautionary efforts by judicial rulings placing heavy evidential
burdens upon it or imposing tortious responsibility if perchance
"6 Id. at 150.
Id. at 149. "[Silbert had] a criminal record. In 1969, he was convicted of
conspiring to, and of violating the Maryland lottery laws .... He was incarcerated from
March 17, 1972 until [he was] paroled on June 5, 1975; he will remain on parole until
sometime in 1984." Id.
" See id. at 151. The court, in discussing the limitation that the New Jersey
Supreme Court placed upon Garifine (namely, that any exclusion must be consistent not
only with the civil rights laws, but also with public policy), indicated that Silbert could
not justify his challenge to the common law right of exclusion because the integrity of
thoroughbred racing required the exclusion of those with prior criminal records.
See, e.g., 320 N.Y.S.2d at 54 n.l (convicted of bookmaking); 363 N.Y.S.2d at
26 (aliases; entering horses in races with false ownership representations); 269 N.Y.S.2d
at 316 (convicted of bookmaking). See also 620 S.W.2d 323 ("undesirable"); 148 A.2d
at 2 (previously charged with but acquitted of bookmaking; "undesirable;" "general
record and reputation warrants his exclusion").
72 N.E.2d 697 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
57 A.2d 335 (Md. 1948).
2 Other cases in which the opinion does not reveal that the patron possessed any
"undesirable characteristics" include: Watkis v. Oaklawn Jockey Club, 86 F. Supp.
1006 (N.D. Ark. 1949); Nation v. Apache Greyhound Park, Inc., 579 P.2d 580 (Ariz.
1978).
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it acted mistakenly; in this connection the substantial interests
of the [racetrack] would appear to coincide with those of the
public generally and to outweigh the comparatively slight in-
terests of its patrons. s3
The better rule, as the Arizona Court of Appeals indicated in
Nation v. Apache Greyhound Park, Inc.,8 may be to allow the
racetrack proprietor to have complete control over admission to
his grounds without having to establish that every person ex-
cluded would, if left to his own devices, commit a crime or
perform some other unlawful activity.85
B. Equal Protection and the Patron
Due to the relative uniformity and strength of the common
law right of the racetrack to exclude any given patron without
justification, several patrons have asserted that the racetrack's
conduct toward them was a violation of their constitutional
rights. The challenger usually contends that the racetrack has
failed to accord him equal protection and due process under the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.8 6
Patrons have most commonly argued that their right of entry
is founded upon their right to equal protection of the laws. 7
The equal protection argument falls, however, unless some type
of state action is involved. 88 Therefore, patrons have tried to
establish state action by arguing first, that a racetrack, in ob-
" 148 A.2d at 5.
579 P.2d 580 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978).
" Id. at 582.
See, e.g., Greenfeld v. Maryland Jockey Club, 57 A.2d at 336; Madden v.
Queens County Jockey Club, Inc., 72 N.E.2d at 698. Challenges to the common law
right of exclusion have also been advanced under the privileges and immunities clause.
See 57 A.2d at 336.
8' While a constitutional challenge to the racetrack's right to exclude patrons is
generally an equal protection argument, the right to exclude horsemen is more often
challenged under the due process clause. See notes 141-42 infra and accompanying text.
In Watkins, the court addressed the issue of state action:
ITIhere is no substantial evidence to support a finding that in ejecting
plaintiff from the race track of the Jockey Club defendants ... were
acting under color of law. On the contrary, the undisputed evidence as
well as the stipulation of the parties showed that they were acting as agents
of the Jockey Club only.
Watkins v. Oaklawn Jockey Club, 183 F.2d 440, 443 (8th Cir. 1950).
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taining its license to conduct pari-mutuel wagering, becomes an
agent of the state, and second, that the license granted to the
racetrack is tantamount to a franchise to perform a public
purpose or calling. 89
Both arguments have failed. 90 The New York Court of Ap-
peals in Madden reasoned that if granting a license to the race-
track made the racetrack the state's agent, then every "licensee,
theatre manager, cab driver, barber, liquor dealer, dog owner-
to mention a few-must be regarded as 'an administrative agency
of the state.' ",91 Nor has the granting of the license to a race-
track been found to create a "franchise" for its owner. Because
racing and wagering existed at common law, "the license, instead
of granting a privilege, merely permits the exercise of [a privi-
lege] restricted and regulated by statute.'' 92
The patron's equal protection argument also failed in Wat-
kins v. Oaklawn Jockey Club,93 in which a uniformed deputy
sheriff-acting as an employee of the racetrack-ejected the
plaintiff.94 The plaintiff argued that the deputy's actions were
performed under "color of law," thereby establishing state ac-
tion.95 Although the officer was a state employee, at the time of
the ejection he was working for the racetrack wholly as its
employee. Therefore, the court found that his actions were con-
sistent with being an agent for the racetrack.
C. Statutes and Regulations Pertaining to Patrons
The common law is not the only authority for the racetrack
to exclude or eject a patron. Numerous statutes, rules and reg-
ulations enacted across the country deal with the problem, and
most purport to grant to the racetrack, or to the racing com-
See 57 A.2d at 337; 72 N.E.2d at 698.
See, e.g., 57 A.2d at 338; 72 N.E.2d at 699.
91 72 N.E.2d at 698-99.
92 Id. at 699-700. The Greenfeld court agreed, observing that under Maryland law
the issuance of a license regulating an activity permissible at common law does not
create a privilege, but merely restricts that right. The Greenfeld decision noted that the
patron's attempt to invoke equal protection of the laws "results from confusion"
between the franchise and licensing concepts. 57 A.2d at 338.
91 183 F.2d 440 (8th Cir. 1950).
Id. at 442.
91 Id. The plaintiff was not arrested, but was merely escorted from the gate.
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mission, authority to exclude patrons either arbitrarily or upon
specified grounds.9
Some of the statutes, rules and regulations mirror the com-
mon law rule, 97 giving the racetrack the unfettered discretion to
eject or exclude any person for any reason9" or for no reason at
all.99 There is a distinction between those statutes, rules and
regulations that require some reason for the exclusion, and those
that permit even arbitrary exclusions without any hint of justi-
fication. For example, rule 462-080(4) of the Oregon Parimutuel
Rules and Regulations provides that "[a] race meet licensee may
eject any person from the race course for any reason and in any
96 See, e.g., KRS § 230.215 (Bobbs-Merrill 1982); ARIZONA HORSE RACING RULES
AND REGULATIONS R. 4-27-121(E)(3)(f) (1983); RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING HORSE
RACING IN ARKANSAS R. 1250 (1985); CALIFORNIA HORSE RACING BOARD RULES AND
REGULATIONS R. 1528 (1984); COLORADO GENERAL RULES OF RACING FOR GREYHOUND
AND HORSE RACE MEETS R. 3.01 (1982); DELAWARE STATE HARNESS RACING COmm'N
RULES AND REGULATIONS R. 5 § 21(K) (1978); FLORIDA HARNESS RACING RULES & REG-
ULATIONS R. 7E-4.02 (11-17) (1984); IDAHO RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR HORSE RACING
AND HORSE RACING MEETINGS R. 343 (1984); ILLINOIS RACING BOARD AND REGULATIONS
OF HARNESS RACING R. 3.02D (1985); IOWA STATE RACING ComI'N RULES OF HARNESS
RACING R. 9.177 (2)c (1984); KENTUCKY RULES OF RACING R. 4 § 23 (1984); LOISIANA
STATE RACING COMM'N RULES OF RACING R. 2.2 0984); RLES AND REGULATIONS OF
MAINE STATE HARNESS RACING COMM'N Ch. 224 (1977); MARYLAND RACING COMM'N
THOROUGHBRED RULES R. .45(Y) (1984); MASSACHUSETTS STATE RACING COMM'N OF
HORSE RACING, R. § 4.44(12) (1985); MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE RACING
COM'N GENERAL RULES R. 431.11300) (1985); MONTANA BOARD OF HORSE RACING R. 23-
4-202(2) (1985); NEBRASKA RLES OF RACING Ch. 6.003 (1984); NEVADA RACING CoMM:'N
REGULATIONS GOVERNING HORSE RACING R. 466.010 (15) (1980); NEW JERSEY RACING
COMM'N RULES AND REGULATIONS OF HARNESS RACING R. 13:71-5.1(a) (1984); RULES
GOVERNING HORSE RACING IN NEW MEXICO R. 41.01 (1983); NEw Yoiu RACING AND
WAGERING BOARD-DWisiON OF HARNESS RACING RULES AND REGULATIONS R. 4119.8 (1933);
OKLAHOMA HORSE RACING ComA'N RULES OF RACING R. 104 (1985); OREGON RACING
COMM'N RULES OF HORSE RACING R. 462-37-005 (4) (1985); PENNSYLVANIA STATE HORSE
RACING COmM'N RULES OF RACING § 163.6(b) (1980); SOUTH DAKOTA Rtr AND REGU-
LATIONS GoVENING HORSE RACING AND HORSE RACING MEETINGS R. 20:04:17:06 (1935);
WASHINGTON HORSE RACING ComM'N RULES OF RACING R. 67.16.060(3) (1934); WEST
VIRGINIA RACING COMM'N RULES OF RACING R. 362 (1985); WYOMING RULES OF RAcING
AND PAiU- niTIuAL EVENTS § 3(s) (1985).
' See notes 50-85 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the racetrack's
common law right to exclude a patron.
" See, e.g., IOwA STATE RACING COMm'N RULES OF RACING, R. 9.177(2)(c) (1984);
OREGON RACING COM11'N PAI-MrTUEL RULES AND REGULATIONS, R. 462-080(4) (1935);
PENNSYLVANIA STATE HORSE RACING COM1I'N RULES OF RACING, § 163.340(g) (1980);
WYOMwG RULES OF RACING AND PARI-MUTUEL EVENTS, § 37(g) (1935).
wSee KENTUCKY RULES OF RACING, R. VI, § 23 (1984).
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manner that is not contrary to law."''0 Such a provision seems
to provide an opportunity for the person excluded to contest the
racetrack's authority to exclude him by challenging the existence
of any "reason" for his exclusion.' 0' On the other hand, certain
statutes and rules, like those in Kentucky, permit even the ar-
bitrary exclusion of a patron. Kentucky Rules of Racing, regu-
laton VI, section 23(1), states: "Associations may eject or exclude
any persons, licensed or unlicensed, from association grounds
or a part thereof solely of its own volition and without any
reason or excuse given therefor."' 0 2 The Kentucky statute closely
parallels the substance of the Kentucky racing rule quoted, but
vests the power to exclude in the racing commission. 0 3 Such
language seems to permit the racetrack or the racing commission
to exclude any patron arbitrarily, so long as the exclusion is not
based upon race, color, creed or national origin.
Although jurisdictions like Oregon and Kentucky may give
the racetrack, the racing commission, or both sweeping powers
of exclusion, the most common type of regulation enumerates,
directly or by reference,104 the grounds that authorize the race-
track or the commission properly to exclude or eject a patron. 0 5
'M OREGON RACING COMM'N PARI-MUTUEL RULES AND REGULATIONS, R. 462-080(4)
(1985) (emphasis added).
'0, This provision requires a finding of fact, which arguably activates a patron's
right to a due process hearing to determine if the requisite "cause" has been established.
"I KENTUCKY RULEaS OF RACING, R. VI, § 23 (1984) (emphasis added).
103
[I]t is the intent hereby to vest in the commission the power to eject or
exclude from association grounds or any part thereof, any person, licensed
or unlicensed, whose conduct or reputation is such that his presence on
association grounds may, in the opinion of the commission, reflect on the
honesty and integrity of thoroughbred racing....
KRS § 230.215(2).
,04 Many of the statutes and regulations do not enumerate punishable violations in
the exclusion provision itself but allow exclusion if the patron violates specific rules.
See, e.g., DE.AwARE STATE HARNESS RACING CoMa'N RULES AND REGULATIONS, R. 20,
§ R (1978) (stating in pertinent part: "Any person, whether a licensed participant or a
patron in violation of any other provisions of Rule 20, may be expelled from the
track."). The rules that a patron might violate include rules against: the use of improper
language, id. at § 1; fraudulent or injurious conduct, id. at § 6; and association with
bookmakers, id. at § 9. 1
101 The following rules allow the racing commission to exclude patrons for reasons
such as improper or fraudulent conduct and association with bookmakers: COLORADO
GENERAL RULES OF RACING FOR GREYHOUND AND HORSE RACE MEETS, R. 3.01 (1982);
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Rule 362 of the West Virginia Racing Commission Rules of
Racing is typical: "Violators of any Rule shall be subject to
ejection from the grounds and/or to fine, suspension or to be
ruled off.' 0 6 The rules of racing that might be violated are
usually quite specific, but most of the rules are more susceptible
to violation by horsemen than by patrons.107
The procedural rights to which the various regulations entitle
the patron are as important as the substantive grounds for
exclusion. Most of the regulations require neither a hearing nor
any specific procedure prior to or at the time of the racetrack's
MICmGAN DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE-RAcING COMII'N GENERAL RULES, R. 431.1130
(1985); RULES GOVERNING HORSE RACING IN Naw MEXICO, R. 41.01 (1934); NEW YoRK
RACING AND WAGERING BOARD-DrvisION OF RULES AND REGULATIONS, R. 4119.8 (1933);
WASHINGTON HORSE RACING COMtM'N RULEs OF RACING, R. 67.16.060(3) (1934).
Other rules divide the authority to exclude among the racetrack, the racing com-
mission and the stewards. See, e.g., ARIZONA HORSE RACING RULES AND REGULATIONS,
R. 4-27-101 (1983); RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING HORSE RACING IN AR.KANsAs, R.
1253 (1985); CALIFORNIA RULEs AND REGULATIONS OF HORSE RACING, § 1529 (1934);
DELAWARE STATE HARNESS RACING COAM'N RULES AND REGULATIONS OF HARNESS RAc-
ING, R. 5, § 21(k) (1978); IDAHO RtLES AND REGULATIONS FOR HORSE RACING AND HORSE
RACING MEETINGS, R. 304 & R. 901 (1984); ILLINOIS RACING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF
HARNESS RACING, R. 3.04 (1985); IOWA STATE RACING COmm'N RULES OF RACING, R.
693-4.8(99D) (1984); KENTUCKY RULES OF RACING, R. I, § 23 & R. XIX, §§ I & 2 (1934);
LOUISIANA STATE RACING COMM1'N RULES OF RACING, R. 1.16 (1984); MAYLAND RACING
COMM'N THOROUGHBRED RULS, Rules .10, .45 Y (1984); MASSACHUSETTS STATE RACING
COMW'N RULES OF HORSE RACING, R. 4.17(4) (1985); MONTANA BOARD OF HORSE RACING
LAW AND RUtES OF HORSE RACING, R. 23-4-202(2) (1985); NEBRASKA RULEs OF RACING,
Ch. 7001.01 (1984); NEVADA RACING COMM'N REGULATIONS GOVERNING HORSE RACING,
R. 466-185 (1980); NEw JERSEY RACING COMM'N RULES AND REGULATIONS OF HARNESS
RACING, R. 13:71-1.20 (1982); OZcAHotA HORSE RACING COMM'N RULES OF RACING, R.
104 & R. 401 (1985); OREGON RACING COsMM'N PARI-MUrtUL RULES AND REGUATIoNS,
R. 462.080 (1985); PENNSYLVANIA STATE HORSE RACING COrMI'N RULES OF RACING, §
163.6 (1980); SOUTH DAKoTA RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING HORSE RACING AND
HORSE RACING MEETINGS, Rules 20:04:17:05, 20:04:17:06 (1985); WEST VIRGINIA RACING
COMM'N Rums OF RACING, R. 698 (1985); WYOMING RULES OF RACING AND PARI-oUTUAL
EVENTS, §§ 2(s) & 37(a) (1985).
Some rules limit the exclusion period. See, e.g., COLORADO GENERAL RULS OF
RACING FOR GREYHOUND AND HORSE RACE MEETS, R. 302 (1982) (summary ejection by
steward is for remainder of day).
6 WEST VIRGINIA RACING COMM'N RULES OF RACING, R. 362 (1985).
107 See, e.g., ARKANsAs RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING HORSE RACING IN
ARKANSAS, R. 1205 (allowing the commission to rule off any person who bribes a racing
official) & R. 1248 (allowing the stewards to rule off those who have violated the rules).
See also id. at R. 1212 (tampering with horses as a violation); id. at R. 1204 (running
an entry the person knows or believes is disqualified as a violation); id. at R. 1216
(administering drugs to a horse as a violation).
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exclusion of a patron. 03 In the minority, Arizona grants the
patron a right to a pre-exclusion hearing.' °9 On the other hand,
many of the regulations provide for some form of appeal pro-
cedure or postexclusion hearing." 0 The racetrack is frequently
"I See, e.g., RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING HORSE RACING IN ARKANSAS
(1985); COLORADO GENERAL RULES OF RACING FOR GREYHOUND AND HORSE RACE MEETS
(1982); DELAWARE STATE HARNESS RACING COMM'N RULES AND REGULATIONS OF HARNESS
RACING 0978); FLORIDA HARNESS RACING RULES AND REGULATIONS (1984); IDAHO RULES
AND REGULATIONS FOR HORSE RACING AND HORSE RACINo MEETINGS (1984); ILLINOIS
RACING BOARD RULES AND REGULATIONS OF HARNESS RACING (1985); IOWA STATE RACING
COMM'N RULES OF RACING (1984); MASSACHUSETTS STATE RACING COMM'N RULES OF
HORSE RACING (1985); MINNESOTA RACING RULES (1985); MONTANA BOARD OF HORSE
RACING LAW AND RULES OF HORSE RACING 0985); NEBRASKA RULES OF RACING (1984);
NEVADA RACING COMM'N REGULATIONS GOVERNING HORSE RACING (1980); NEW JERSEY
RACING COMM'N RULES AND REGULATIONS OF HARNESS RACING (1984); RULES GOVERNING
HORSE RACING IN NEW MEXICO (1983); NEW YORK RACING AND WAGERING BOARD-
DIVISION OF HARNESS RACING RULES AND REGULATIONS (1983); OKLAHOM.A HORSE RACING
COMM'N RULES OF RACING (1985); OREGON RACING COMM'N RULES OF HORSE RACING
(1985); OREGON RACING COmM'N PARI-MUTUEL RULES AND REGULATIONS (1985); PENN-
SYLVANIA STATE HORSE RACING COMM'N RULES OF RACING (1985); WASHINGTON HORSE
RACING COMM'N RULES OF RACING (1984); WEST VIRGINIA RACING COMM'N RULES OF
RACING (1985); WYOMING RULEs OF RACING AND PARI-mInjmAL EVENTS (1985). The au-
thority of a racing commission to exclude a patron is discussed in notes 211-14 infra
and accompanying text.
"I ARIZONA HORSE RACING RULES AND REGULATIONS, § 121 (e)(6)(c) (1983), provides
that when the stewards have reason to believe that a rule has been violated by any
person, the procedure shall be as follows:
a. The person shall be summoned to a hearing at which all stewards shall
be present.
b. Twenty-four hour's notice of said hearing shall be given to the person
in writing....
c. No penalty shall be imposed until such hearing.
See also SOUTH DAKOTA RUtLS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING HORSE RACING AND HORSE
RACING MEETINGS, R. 20:04:01:13 (1985) (providing for an almost identical procedure).
"I See, e.g., ARIZONA HORSE RACING RULES AND REGULATIONS, R. 4-27-123 (1983);
RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING HORSE RACING IN ARKANSAS, R. 1257 (1985); CAL-
IFORNIA HORSE RACING BOARD RULES AND REGULATIONS, § 1983 (1984); COLORADO GEN-
ERAL RULES OF RACING FOR GREYHOUND AND HORSE RACE MEETS, R. 4.01 (1982); IDAHO
RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR HORSE RACING AND HORSE RACING MEETINGS, Rules 1001-
06 (1984); LOUISIANA STATE RACING COM'N RUtES OF RACING, R. 52.1 (1984); HARNESS
RACING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE MAINE STATE HARNESS RACING COMM'N, Ch.
237 (1977); MARYLAND RACING COMM'N THOROUGHBRED RULES, R. .10 (1984); MASSA-
CHUSETrS STATE RACING COMM'N RULES OF HORSE RACING, R. 4.03 0985); MICHIGAN
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE RACING COMM'N GENERAL RULE, R. 431.1130 (1985);
MONTANA BOARD OF HORSE RACING LAW AND RULES OF HORSE RACING, R. 8.22.302
(1985); NEBRASKA RULES OF RACING, Ch. 7 (1984); NEVADA RACING CoMM'N REGULATIONS
GOVERNING HORSE RACING, R. 466.185 (1980); NEW JERSEY RACING COMM'N RULES AND
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under no obligation to disclose the existence of these rights;"'
therefore, the ordinary patron probably will not take advantage
of his rights unless he somehow becomes aware of them through
an independent source.
The scope of the exclusion also varies. While most statutes,
rules and regulations permit the racetrack or racing commission
to exclude the patron from the racetrack "premises,"" 2 others
provide that a patron excluded from a single racetrack may also
be excluded from all others within the state."3
REGULATIONS OF HARNESS RACING, R. 13:71-3.1 (1984); RULES GOVERNING HORSE RACING
IN NEW MEXICO, R. 42.02 (1983); NEW YORK RACING & WAGERING BoARD-DvtsioN OF
HARNESS RACING RULES AND REGULATIONS, § 4121.5 (1983); OmaAom HORSE RACING
COMM'N RULES oF RACING, R. 108 (1985); OREGON RACING COMM'N PAIU-MUTUEL RULES
AND REGULATIONS, R. 462.405 (1985); PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF RACING, R. 163.481 (1985);
WASHINGTON RULES OF RACING, R. 260.88010 (1984); WEST VmoINI RULES OF RACING,
R. 803 (1985); Wyomnr, RULES OF RACING, § 4 (1985).
Some other rules imply a right to appeal without expressly granting one. See, e.g.,
KENTUCKY RACING RULES (1984).
" See, e.g., DELAWARE STATE HARNESS RACING COIM,'N RULES AND REGULATIONS
OF HARNESS RACING (1978). The CALIFORNIA HORSE RACING BOARD RULES AND REoU-
LATIONS, § 1982 (1984) requires the track to disclose the existence of these rights, an
exception to the general practice.
"I See, e.g., RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING HORSE RACING IN ArcANSAS, R.
1250 (1985); KENTUCKY RULES OF RACING, R. XIX, §§ I & 2 (1984); LOUISIANA RULES
OF RACING, R. 1.16; RACING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE MAINE STATE HARNESS
RACING COm'N, Ch. 224 (1984); MASSACHUSETTS STATE RACING COMM'N RULES OF
HORSE RACING, R. 4.02(9) (1984); MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE RACING
COMM'N GENERAL RULES, R. 431.1005(0 (1985); NEBRASKA RULES OF RACING, Ch. 6.003
(1984); NEVADA RACING COMM'N REGULATIONS GOVERNING HORSE RACING, R. 466.01005)
(1985); NEW YORK RACING AND WAGERING BOARD-DviSION OF HARNESS RACING RULES
AND REGULATIONS, § 4100.1(13) (1983); NEvw MExico RULES GOVERNING HORSE RACING,
R. 41.12 (1983); WASHINGTON RULES OF RACING, R. 260.84.060 (1984); WEST VIRGINIA
RULES OF RACING, R. 362 (1985); WYO1ING RULES OF RACING AND PARI-MItrUAL EVENTS,
§ 3(f) (1985). In the foregoing rules and regulations, the terminology used to describe
the premises varies, with some rules referring to the racetrack "premises," see, e.g.,
RULEs AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING HORSE RACING IN ARKANSAS, R. 1250 (1985), and
some rules referring to the racetrack "grounds," see, e.g., LOUISIANA STATE RACING
COMM'N RULS OF RACING, R. 1.16 (1984). For purposes of this Article, the terms
"premises" and "grounds" are synonomous. The distinctions do not seem significant.
" See, e.g., CALIFORNIA HORSE RACING BOARD RULES AND REGULATIONS, § 1528
(1984); COLORADO GENERAL RULES OF RACING FOR GREYHOUND AND HORSE RACE MEETS,
R. 3.05 (1982); DELAWARE STATE HARNESS RACING COMII'N RULES AND REGULATIONS OF
HARNESS RACING, R. 20, § 10 (1978); FLORIDA HARNESS RACING RULES & REGULATIONS,
R. 7E-4.02(14) (1984); ILLINOIS RACING BOARD RULES AND REGULATIONS OF HARNESS
RACING, R. 4.15 (1985); MONTANA BOARD OF HORSE RACING LAW AND RULES OF HORSE
RACING, 23.4-202(2) (1985); OKLAHOMA HORSE RACING COu a'N RULES OF RACING, R.
104 (1985).
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The statutes and regulations have one of two effects on the
patron exclusion analysis: they either supplement the common
law right of exclusion or abrogate that right." 4 In James v.
Churchill Downs, Inc.," s the Kentucky Court of Appeals con-
fronted the abrogation issue for the first time. In James, the
plaintiffs argued that the Kentucky exclusion statute" 16 abrogated
the previously recognized common law right of the racetrack to
exclude a patron." 7 Refusing to accept the plaintiffs' arguments,
the court found that the Kentucky statute granting the Kentucky
State Racing Commission the authority to exclude a patron had
no effect on the racetrack's common law right to exclude the
patron as well." 8 According to the court, the legislative intent
was "to expand the common law right of exclusion by vesting
an additional entity, the Kentucky State Racing Commission,
with authority to exercise the right" to exclude.' 9 The courts of
1" Compare Gottlieb v. Sullivan County Harness Racing Ass'n, 269 N.Y.S.2d at
316 (statutory right seems to supplement common law right) with Burrillville Racing
Ass'n v. Garabedian, 318 A.2d 469, 472 (R.I. 1974) (statute abrogates the common law).
"' 620 S.W.2d 323 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
116 KRS § 230.215(2) provides, in pertinent part:
In addition to the general powers and duties vested in the commission by
KRS 230.210 to 230.260, it is the intent hereby to vest in the commission
the power to eject or exclude from association grounds or any part thereof
any person, licensed or unlicensed, whose conduct or reputation is such
that his presence on association grounds may, in the opinion of the com-
mission, reflect on the honesty and integrity of thoroughbred racing or
interfere with the orderly conduct of thoroughbred racing or Appaloosa
racing.
KRS § 230.260 provides in pertinent part:
The commission is vested with jurisdiction and supervision over all thor-
oughbred race meetings in this Commonwealth and over all associations
and all persons on association grounds and may eject or exclude therefrom
or any part thereof, any person, licensed or unlicensed, whose conduct or
reputation is such that his presence on association grounds may, in the
opinion of the commission, reflect on the honesty and integrity of thor-
oughbred racing or Appaloosa racing or interfere with the orderly conduct
of . .. racing ... provided, however, no persons shall be excluded or
ejected from association grounds solely on the ground of race, color, creed,
national origin, ancestry, or sex.
11 620 S.W.2d at 324.
"I Id. at 324-25 (quoting Spirko v. Commonwealth, 480 S.W.2d 169 (Ky. 1972),
for the proposition under Kentucky law that "[t]he intention to abrogate the common
law will not be presumed and the intention to repeal it by statute must be clearly
apparent").
"9 620 S.W.2d at 325.
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Florida, New Hampshire, and New York have reached similar
conclusions. 120
Other courts, however, have determined that the specific
statutes or regulations in their jurisdictions abrogate the race-
track's common law right to exclude a patron. 2 ' In Rockwell v.
Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Comm'n,'2 the court found
that the enactment of the Pennsylvania Thoroughbred Horse
Race Meeting Corporation Act'2 abrogated the racetrack's com-
mon law right to exclude patrons. The court reasoned that,
because the legislature had enacted a specific statute to deal with
exclusion, the statute necessarily negated the common law. 24
Similarly, the Rhode Island Supreme Court, in Burrillville Rac-
ing Ass'n v. Garabedian,'15 reached the same conclusion in find-
ing that a similar statute replaced the common law.' 26 The court
explained when a statutory enactment will override long-standing
common law principles:
We have in the past often stated that it is always presumed
that in enacting a statute, the Legislature did not intend to
make any alteration in the common law unless the language
used naturally and necessarily leads to that conclusion or unless
the intent to alter [the common law] is clearly expressed. 27
The principles of statutory construction vary from state to state,
making it impossible to generalize about the effect of a given
statute upon the common law right of exclusion, but it appears
that a court will not abrogate the common law without first
determining that such was the legislative intent. 2 8
110 See Tropical Park, Inc. v. Jock, 374 So. 2d at 640; Tamelleo v. New Hampshire
Jockey Club, Inc., 163 A.2d at 13; People v. Licata, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 55; Presti v. New
York Racing Ass'n, Inc., 363 N.Y.S.2d at 26; Gottlieb v. Sullivan County Harness
Racing Ass'n, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
2I See, e.g., Rockwell v. Pennsylvania Horse Racing Comm'n, 327 A.2d 211 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1974); Burrillville Racing Ass'n v. Parker, 320 A.2d 334 (R.I. 1974);
Burrillville Racing Ass'n v. Garabedian, 318 A.2d 469 (R.I. 1974); Burrillville Racing
Ass'n v. Mello, 270 A.2d 513 (R.I. 1970).
121 327 A.2d 211 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974).
W Act of Dec. I!, 1967, P.L. 707 (15 P.S. § 2651 et seq.).
11 327 A.2d at 214.
.25 318 A.2d 469 (R.I. 1974).
,26 Id. at 472.
2 Id. at 471.
128 See, e.g., id.
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Courts consistently recognize the racetrack's need to regulate
patrons admitted to its premises, as well as the state racing
commission's interest in controlling access to all racetracks within
the state. Most courts have upheld the racetrack's absolute com-
mon law right to exclude a patron, even without cause. Over
time, the rationale for the right to exclude a patron has evolved
into a blend of real estate principles and public policy consid-
erations. Significantly, many states have now enhanced the com-
mon law right by enacting statutes or rules authorizing-and in
some cases even requiring-the racing commission, the individual
racetrack, or both to exclude patrons whose presence at the
racetrack is not in the best interests of racing. Thus, both the
common law right and its statutory and regulatory counterparts
exist today in almost every jurisdiction where racing is con-
ducted, thereby giving the racetrack and the racing commission
almost complete discretion to exclude the patron.
III. EXCLUSION OF HORSEMEN FROM THE RACETRACK
Racetracks often desire to exclude from their premises horse-
men who assert a right to be at the racetrack to pursue their
occupations as horse owners, trainers, jockeys or other racing
commission licensees. The situation of the professional horse-
man, and his need to be at the racetrack to pursue his vocation,
makes the analysis of the racetrack's right to exclude him dif-
ferent than that in the case of patrons.
A. The Common Law Right as Applied to Horsemen
The exclusion of a jockey provides a good example of the
types of additional considerations that the courts find important
in addressing the racetrack's right to exclude horsemen. In Mar-
tin v. Monmouth Park Jockey Club,29 the plaintiff, a jockey,
after exclusion from the racetrack, sought injunctive relief to
compel the racetrack management to allow him to ride the
mounts that he had secured. Martin had been previously sus-
pended from riding in a neighboring state, but had been rein-
stated. Also, Martin had received his license as a jockey from
1" 145 F. Supp. 439 (D. N.J. 1956).
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the state of New Jersey, where Monmouth Park is located. The
plaintiff attempted to gain admittance to the racetrack to per-
form his occupation by arguing to the court, first, that the
racetrack was a quasi-public corporation that could not arbi-
trarily exclude him, and second, that the racetrack could not
restrict his right to ride because the state had granted him a
jockey license. 30
As in the patron cases,' 3' the court in Martin found that the
racetrack was a private corporation with the right to admit or
exclude anyone it pleased, absent some other legal restriction.' 32
Martin's license from the New Jersey Racing Commission did
not insure that he would be able to ride at any specific racetrack.
The plaintiff argued that his license gave him rights equivalent
to that of a licensed physician to practice his profession in a
given hospital. The court indicated that, although some decisions
have dealt with the physician/hospital issue, these precedents did
not go as far as the plaintiff would take them: "The most
favorable conclusion that the plaintiff can draw from them is
that exclusion may not be without justification.' ' 33 The court
found the exclusion justified and proper.'3 4 Although the deci-
sion still favored the racetrack, it modified the absolute common
law right of exclusion when applied to a horseman, at least by
requiring some justification for the exclusion.
In Catrone v. State Racing Comm'n,13 the Massachusetts
Appeals Court reiterated this position in deciding that a "race-
track at least may exclude licensed persons from participation in
racing activity in the exercise of a reasonable business judg-
ment."' 3 6 In Catrone, the racetrack had excluded the plaintiff,
, Id.
, ' See note 56 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the racetrack's
private status.
,.2 145 F. Supp. at 440. The other types of legal restrictions might include exclusion
of a licensee because of his race, creed, color, sex or national origin.
- Id. at 441. Cf. Marzocca v. Ferone, 461 A.2d 1133 (N.J. 1983). The Marzocca
court announced that it would not interfere with the "business relationships" between
the private racetrack and the individuals pursuing "their vocational activities" without
finding some regulation permitting such interference. See id. at 1137.
"14 145 F. Supp. at 441. The court's justification was that the excluded jockey had
placed bets on horses racing against the one that he rode. Id.
M 459 N.E.2d 474 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984).
'36 Id. at 477.
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Catrone, from entering his horses, and in addition, had refused
him stall space on the racetrack's grounds. The Massachusetts
racing commission's authority to promulgate rules and regula-
tions covering the horse racing industry, including the right to
license a racetrack, did not make that licensed racetrack a public
utility. On the contrary, the racetrack remained a private cor-
poration, "at liberty to deal (or reasonably to refrain from
dealing) with licensed owners, trainers, and jockeys at least in
accordance with sound business judgment."'' 37 The court con-
cluded that, even though the horse racing industry is heavily
regulated,3 8 a private racetrack still had the authority to exclude
any individual licensee from its grounds, within the bounds of
"sound business judgment.' 3 9 In addition, the court stated that,
unless a specific legislative purpose to modify the common law
right of a racetrack to determine which licensed individuals
would be permitted on its grounds is present, the common law
right would prevail. 4'
Finally, Catrone claimed that state action was involved be-
cause the stewards at the racetrack and the racing commission
itself ultimately became involved with his situation, 4' implying
that this entitled him to due process even upon the racetrack's
exercise of its right of exclusion. The court rejected this argu-
ment. Although the stewards, one of whom was appointed by
" Id. at 476.
"' See note 96 supra for citations to many of the states' racing rules.
" 459 N.E.2d at 477. See also Saumell v. New York Racing Ass'n, 460 N.Y.S.2d
763 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1983). Cf. Jacobson v. New York Racing Ass'n, 305 N.E.2d 765,
768 (N.Y. 1973). In Jacobson, the court found that a racetrack in New York did not
have the right to exclude a licensed owner and trainer on an arbitrary basis. It is
important, however, to note the difference between racing in the State of New York
and in other jurisdictions. In New York, the New York Racing Association, the defendant
in Jacobson, operates all but one of the thoroughbred racetracks found within the state.
Therefore, the court relied heavily upon this "virtual monopoly power" and decided
that the racetrack should not have "an absolute immunity from having to justify the
exclusion of an owner and trainer whom the state has deemed fit to license." Id. Evans
v. Arkansas Racing Comm'n, 606 S.W.2d 578 (Ark. 1980), contrasts with Jacobson.
Even though the plaintiff in Evans, a properly licensed owner and trainer, was not
permitted by the state's only racetrack to race his horses there, the court upheld the
racing commission's decision banning Evans from entering his horses in races at the
racetrack. Id. at 585.
"1 459 N.E.2d at 476-77. See 461 A.2d at 1137.
"4 459 N.E.2d at 479.
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the racing commission, failed to interfere with the racetrack's
actions and the racing commission upheld the exclusion order,
the exclusion did not involve state action. 42
In summary, when the common law right of exclusion is
applied to a horseman, the courts will review the racetrack's
exercise of discretion. The racetrack, however, need only show
some justification or the exercise of sound business judgment
that does not offend the court's sensibilities.
B. Statutes, Rules and Regulations Pertaining to the
Exclusion of Horsemen
Many states have statutory or regulatory provisions that
grant authority to the racetrack or the racing commission to
exclude horsemen, either arbitrarily or on specified grounds,
from the premises of the racetrack or from all racetracks within
the state. 143 Because such statutes, rules and regulations are
usually cumulative with the racetrack's pre-existing common law
rights,'"4 these statutory and regulatory provisions generally sup-
plement any rights that the racetrack may already have to ex-
clude an individual horseman. 45 Because the racing commission
has no such authority at common law, however, the statutes and
regulations pertaining to exclusion of horsemen constitute the
limits of the racing commission's direct exclusionary authority
in the matter, although in practice the racing commission's use
of its licensing power may lead to similar results.'"
142 Id.
'41 See notes 112-13 supra and accompanying text.
' See notes 114-28 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the effect of
statutes and regulations authorizing exclusion based upon the racetrack's common law
rights.
'" See notes 129-42 supra for a discussion of a racetrack's common law right to
exclude horsemen.
246 Many jurisdictions' statutes, rules and regulations grant the racing commission
authority over all aspects of racing, and also grant the racing commission authority to
license all horsemen. See notes 163-76 infra and accompanying text. Several horsemen
have argued that the racing commission's authority over licensing has preempted or
abrogated the racetrack's right to exclude horsemen, but courts have either rejected or
ignored this argument. See, e.g., Martin v. Monmouth Park Jockey Club, 145 F. Supp.
439; Catrone v. State Racing Comm'n, 459 N.E.2d 474; Saumell v. New York Racing
Ass'n, 460 N.Y.S.2d 763. Others have contended that the racetrack's authority to exclude
constitutes an improper delegation of the racing commission's authority. This contention
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In many jurisdictions the regulation providing for exclusion
refers to the exclusion of "any person" for a violation of the
rules. 47 Thus, given its plain meaning, such a regulation could
be applied to exclude horsemen, as well as patrons, from the
racetrack. Some jurisdictions, however, expressly use the term
licensee in their regulations pertaining to exclusion. 48 For ex-
ample, the Ohio State Racing Commission Thoroughbred/Quar-
terhorse Rules and Regulations, Rule 3769-9-99(b), provides:
In addition to any other penalty provided, or in the event no
penalty has been provided, the commission, may, upon finding
a licensee has violated a rule of this chapter, fine the licensee
an amount not in excess of the amount prescribed by law and/
or deny, suspend or revoke any Ohio State Racing Commission
license held by the licensee and/or rule off any such licensee
from all Ohio race tracks. 49
This rule specifically provides for the ruling
off 50  of licensed horsemen from all Ohio race-
has likewise been rejected. See, e.g., Tamelleo v. New Hampshire Jockey Club, Inc.,
163 A.2d 10, 12-13 (N.H. 1960). Cf. Fink v. Cole, 97 N.E.2d 873 (N.Y. 1951) (legislative
delegation of licensing power to private corporation is unconstitutional).
147 See, e.g., ARizONA HORSE RACING RULES AND REGULATIONS, R. 4-27-121.6 (1983);
RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING HORSE RACING N ARKANsAs, R. 1248 (1985);
DELAWAR STATE HARNESS RACING COMM'N RuLEs AND REGULATIONS OF HANEESS RAC-
ING, R. 5 § 21(k) (1978); IDAHO RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR HORSE RACING AND HORSE
RACING MEETINGS, R. 343 (1984); ILLINOIS RACING BOARD RuLEs AND REGULATIONS OF
HARNESS RACING, R. 301 (1985); IowA STATE RACING COM'N RULES OF RACING, R.
693-9.177(99D)(2)(C) (1984); RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE MAINE STATE HARNEss
RACING COMM'N, Ch. 224 (1977); MARYLAND RACING COMM'N THOROUGHBRED RULES,
R. 10 (1984); NEBRAsKA Rtn.Es OF RACING, Ci. 6.003 0984); RULES GOVERNING HORSE
RACING IN NEW MEXICO, R. 41.01 (1983); OREGON RACING COMM'N RULES OF HORSE
RACING, R. 462-37-005 (1985); PENNSYLVANIA STATE HORSE RACING COIE'N RULS OF
RACING § 163.6(b) 0980); SouTH DAKOTA RULS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING HORSE
RACING AND HORSE RACING MEETINGS, R. 20:04:17:16 (1985); WASMNGTON HORSE RACING
COMM'N RULES oF RAcING, R. 260-84-060 (1984); WYOMING RULES OF RACING AND PARI-
MUTUAL EVENTS, § 3(s) (1985).
I's See, e.g., CALIFoRNIA HORSE RACING BOARD RULES AND REGULATIONS, R. 3.01
(1984); KENTUCKY RULES OF RACING, R. IV, § 3(3) (1984); MARYLAND RACING COMM'N
THOROUGHBRED RULES, R. .45Y (1984); MIcHiGAN DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE-RACING
COMM'R GENERAL RUE.s, R. 431.1130(1) (1985); NEw YORK RACING AND WAGERING BoARD-
DIVISION OF HARNESS RACING RULES AND REGULATIONS, § 4119.8 (1983).
"I Ono STATE RACING COMM'N THOROUGHBRED/QUARTERHORSE OFFICIAL RULES
AND REGULATIONS, R. 3769-9-99(b) (1985).
"i "Ruled off" means "denied access to any permit holder's premises during racing
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tracks."' The Arizona Horse Racing Rules and Regulations also
specifically provide for the "ruling off" of licensees, stating:
In addition, the stewards may suspend, after a hearing for a
period of time up to sixty (60) days, any person violating any
of these Rules, and may rule off licensees violating any of
these Rules. Nothing in these Rules shall prevent the stewards
from imposing both a civil penalty and suspension for the
same violation.'5 2
This statute distinguishes "any person" from a "licensee" by
making licensees subject to different penalties,'53 and thus, ar-
guably, horsemen in states such as Arizona might not fall within
the "any person" category.'5 4
The standard for exclusion from the racetrack is often the
breach of one of the jurisdiction's rules of racing. In many
cases, these statutes or regulations prohibit certain conduct by
horsemen licensed by the racing commission, but not necessarily
conduct by the patrons. The Illinois Rules and Regulations of
Harness Racing, for example, have a number of separate rules
specifically directed toward horsemen, including the following
rather typical provisions:
Rule 20.5 Betting on Starters
meetings conducted by the permit holder and forbidden to participate in any way
whatsoever in the racing conducted during such racing meetings." Id. at R. 3769-1-10.
Id. at R. 3769-9-99(b).
,.Z ARIZONA HORSE RACING RULEs AND REGULATIONS, R. 121 E.3f (1933). See also
LOUISIANA RULES OF RACING, R. 2.2 (1984); MICHIGAN DEPAR1TMENT OF AGRICULTURE
RACING COIM'N GENERAL RuLEs, R. 431.1130(1) (1985); NEBRASicA RULES OF RACING, Ch.
18.001 (1984); Omo STATE RACING COMM'N THOROUGHBRED/QUARTERHORSE OFFICIAL
RULES AND REGULATIONS, R. 3769-4-99(e) (1985); OREGON RULES OF HoRSE RACING, R.
462-35-005(3) (1985); PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF RACING, § 163.471(a) (1985); WEST VIRGINIA
RULES OF RACING, R. 698 (1985); NVYO?,=G RULES oF RACING AND PARI-MUTUAL EvENTS,
§ 10(a) (1985).
'" ARIZONA HORSE RACING RULES AND REGULATIONS, R. 121 E.3f (1983).
'1 Compare CALIFORNIA HORSE RACING BOARD RULS AND REGULATIONS, § 1405
(1985) (The "Board may independently punish any misconduct of any person connected
with racing," perhaps indicating that horsemen may be subject to different, if not
additional, disciplinary measures than patrons) with NEBRASMA RULES oF RACING, Ch.
6.003 (1984) ("[v]iolators of any rules shall be subject to ejection from the grounds and/
or suspension or to be ruled off," suggesting that patrons as well as horsemen may be
ejected or ruled off).
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No owner, trainer, driver, agent, employee or attendant shall
bet or cause any other person to bet on his behalf on any
horse in any race in which a horse owned, trained or driven
by him or in which he in any way represents or handles is a
starter.
Rule 20.6 Fraudulent Proposals
If any person under the jurisdiction or control of the board is
approached with any offer or promise of a bribe ... it shall
be the duty of such person to report immediately such matters
to the judges and the board. Persons violating this section will
be suspended for a period of not less than 30 days to a lifetime
suspension."5
The prohibitions directed toward licensees are not always spe-
cific, as the following rather broad Illinois provisions attest:
Rule 20.7 Acts Injurious to Racing
Any misconduct on the part of a race track operator or par-
ticipant, fraudulent in its nature or injurious to the character
of the turf, although not specified in these rules, is forbidden.
Any person or persons who individually or in concert with one
another, shall fraudulently and corruptly, by any means, affect
the outcome of any race or affect a false registration or commit
any other act injurious to the sport, shall be guilty of a
violation.
Rule 20.10 Association With Undesirables
No owner, driver, trainer, groom attendant or any other person
having charge of or access to any horse shall at any time
associate with, consort with or in any manner communicate
with any known bookmaker, tout or persons of similar pursuits
either on or off the track. If the reputation of a gambler,
bookmaker, tout or person of similar pursuit is notorious, the
owner, driver, trainer, groom attendant or other persons hav-
ing charge of, or access to any horse shall be presumed to
have knowledge of the fact. 5 6
ILLINOIS RuLEs AND REGULATIONS OF HARNESS RAcING, R. 20.5 & R. 20.6 (1985).
', Id. at R. 20.7 & R. 20.10.
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Violators of these rules, horsemen in most cases, may be sub-
jected to ejection from the grounds, fine, suspension or being
ruled off. 57
The Colorado General Rules of Racing for Greyhound and
Horse Race Meets, on the other hand, contain a single prohi-
bition that may result in the ejection either of patrons or horse-
men.5 8 Colorado's rule 3.01 states:
The Commission through the proper personnel may summarily
eject from a racetrack any licensed or unlicensed person whose
conduct while on the racetrack interferes with the orderly and
proper conduct of a meet. Conduct considered to interfere
with the conduct of a meet includes, but is not limited to:
bookmaking or acting as a runner for a bookmaker; touting;
pickpocketing; altering pari-mutuel tickets; offering to cash
altered pari-mutuel tickets; entering or attempting to enter that
portion of a racetrack open only to licensees or racing officials;
entering or attempting to enter a racetrack without first pur-
chasing a ticket to enter; being intoxicated by the use of alcohol
or drugs; and possession of a narcotic or drug which violates
state or federal laws. In addition, persons will be ejected from
the racetrack for acting in a disorderly manner. Such conduct
includes, but is not limited to: the use of words which tend to
incite others to unlawful conduct; making unreasonable noises;
fighting; striking or threatening to strike another person; dis-
charging a firearm; and displaying a firearm. A licensee who
engages in the above conduct will be subject to disciplinary
action in addition to summary ejection.'5 9
As a practical matter, the prohibitions in the racing rules of
a given state against pickpocketing, intoxication, disorderly con-
duct and fighting provide grounds for the ejection of either
patrons or horsemen,'1° while the prohibitions against conduct
such as fraudulently affecting the outcome of a race will be
grounds for the ejection only of horsemen. 6' These and other
"I Id. at R. 3.02. See also note 147 supra for a listing of jurisdictions where
violation of the rules may result in exclusion or ruling off from the racetrack.
"' COLORADo GENERAL RULES OF RACING FOR GREYHOUND AND HORSE RACE MEETS,
R. 3.01 (1982).
159 Id.
160 See id.
161 See ILLINOIS RULES AND REGULTIONS OF HARNESS RACING, R. 20.5-.7 & R. 20.10.
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distinctions between the treatment of patrons and horsemen
under the statutes and regulations indicate that the right of
exclusion will vary depending upon the classification into which
the party to be excluded falls. 62
The exclusion regulations of many jurisdictions permit the
revocation or suspension of a horseman's license as well as his
ejection from the racetrack. 63 Obviously, because horsemen are
licensed by the state and the ordinary patron is not, the penalty
of revocation or suspension of a license is applicable only to
horsemen. 64
Most jurisdictions provide the horseman with some type of
procedural protection if the racing commission or its agents
threatens him with either exclusion from the racetrack or the
loss of his license. 6 Although many jurisdictions authorize race-
tracks to exclude "any person, 166 few, if any, have delegated
authority directly to the racetrack if a license is involved. 67
Instead, jurisdictions generally vest the authority to revoke or
161 See text accompanying notes 163-77 infra for a discussion of other differences
between the right to exclude patrons and the right to exclude horsemen.
'1' See, e.g., ARIZONA HORSE RACING RULES AND REGULATIONS, R. 121 6f (1983);
CALIFORNIA HORSE RACING BOARD RULES AND REGULATIONS, § 1528 (1984); FLORIDA
HARNESS RACING RULES AND REGULATIONS, Ch. 7E-4.29(4) (1984); IDAHO RULES AND
REGULATIONS FOR HORSE RACING AND HORSE RACING MEETINGS, R. 343 (1984); ILLINOIS
RULES AND REGULATIONS OF HARNESS RACING, R. 3.02 (1985); LOUISIANA RULES OF
RACING, R. 57.2 0984); MONTANA BOARD OF HORSE RACING, R. 8.22.1501(24) (1985);
RULES GOVERNING HORSE RACING IN NEW MEXICO, R. 41.01 (1984); Omo STATE RACING
COMM'N THOROUGHERED/QUARTERHORSE OFFCAL RULES AND REGULATIONS, R. 3769-4-
99(E) (1985); OKLAHOA RULES OF RACING, R. 104 (1985); OREGON RULES OF HORSE
RACING, R. 462-35-005(3) (1985).
-" One of the California rules is a good example of a provision imposing such a
penalty:
Violation of any provision of this chapter, whether or not a penalty is
fixed therein, is punishable in the discretion of the Board by revocation or
suspension of any license, by fine, or by exclusion from all racing inclosures
under the jurisdiction of the Board, or by any combination of these
penalties.
CALIFORNIA HORSE RACING BOARD RULES AND REGULATIONS, § 1405 (1984).
"I The same procedural protections may not be afforded if the racetrack excludes
the horseman.
'- See note 147 supra and accompanying text.
' None of the jurisdictions examined by the authors grants the racetrack the
exclusive right to revoke or suspend a license.
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suspend licenses with their respective racing commissions,1 63 to
suspend licenses with their stewards, 69 and to revoke or suspend
licenses with a number of racetrack affiliates with a right of
final appeal to the racing commission. 70 These distinctions are
important to an understanding of the procedural rights of a
horseman when his license is at stake, or he is subject to being
"ruled off" the racetrack.
Iowa grants stewards the authority to suspend a horseman's
license upon a finding of a rules violation.' 7 ' The stewards,
however, may suspend the license for no more than thirty days
after the ruling, 72 and it is left to the racing commission to
Im See, e.g., KENTUCKY RULES OF RACING, R. XIX, § 2 (1984); PENNSYLVANIA RULES
OF RACING, § 163.6(d) (1985); vYOMING RULES OF RACING AND PARI-M-UTUEL EVENTS, §
49(b) (1985).
'6 See, e.g., ARIZONA HORSE RACING RULES AND REGULATIONS, R. 121 6f (1933);
RULES AND REGUfATIONS GOVERNING HORSE RACING IN ARKANSAS, R. 1253 (1985); CAL-
IFORNA HORSE RACING BOARD RULES AND REGULATIONS, § 1528 (1984); IDAHO RU.ES
AND REGULATIONS FOR HORSE RACING AND HORSE RACING MEETINGS, R. 901 (1984);
ILLINOIS RULES AND REGULATIONS OF HARNESS RACING, R. 3.04 (1985); LOUISIANA RULES
OF RACING, R. 57.2 (1984); MASSACHUSETTS RULES OF HORSE RACING, R. 4.16(1) (1985);
NEW JERSEY RACING COMM'N RULES AND REGULATIONS, R. 13:71-1.20 (1982); OKLAHOMA
RULES OF RACING, R. 408 (1985). "Stewards" are the "three individuals who uphold the
rules of racing at a racetrack. They are answerable to the state racing commission and
their decisions can be appealed to that body." LOHMAN & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 65,
at 220.
170 See, e.g., ARIZONA HORSE RACING RULES AND REGULATIONS, R. I01 E (1983);
RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING HORSE RACING IN ARKANSAS, R. 1256 (1985); CAL-
IFORNIA HORSE RACING BOARD RULES AND REGULATIONS, § 1983 (1984); IDAHO RULES AND
REGULATIONS FOR HORSE RACING AND HORSE RACING MEETINGS, R. 1001 (1984); ILLNOIS
RULES AND REGULATIONS OF HARNESS RACING, R. 4.05 (1985); IOWA RULES OF RACING,
R. 693-4.7(99D) (1984); KENTUCKY RUIES OF RACING, R. XX, § 1(8) (1984); LOUISIANA
RULES OF RACING, R. 57.2 (1984); RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE MAINE STATE HARNESS
RACING COWA'N, Ch. 23 (5) (1977); MARYI.AND RACING CONDI'N THOROUGHBRED RULES,
R. 09.10.01.10(B) (1984); MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE-RAcING COM'N GEN-
ERAL RULES, R. 431-1130(3) (1985); MINNESOTA RULES OF RACING, R. 7897.0150 (3) (1985);
NEBRASKA RULES OF RACING, Ch. 7.001 (1984); NEVADA RACING COMM'N REGULATIONS
GOVERNING HORSE RACING, R. 466.185 (1980); NEW YoR HARNESS RACING RULES AND
REGULATIONS, § 4121.5 (1983); OHIO STATE RACING COMI'N THOROUGHBRED/QUARTER-
HORSE OFFICIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS, R. 3769-7-42 (1985); OI 1O.A RULES OF
RACING, R. 108 (1985); OREGON RULES OF HORSE RACING, R. 462-35-025 (1935); SOUTH
DAKOTA RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING HORSE RACING AND HORSE RACING MEET-
INGS, R. 20:04:01:12 (1985); WASHINGTON RULES OF RACING, R. 260-88-010 (1984); WEST
VIRGINIA RULES OF RACING, R. 60 (1985); WYOMNG RULES OF RACING AND PARI-MUTUEL
EVENTS, R. 4(a) (1985).
"' IOWA RULES OF RACING, R. 693-9.177(99D)(1) (1984).
172 Id.
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actually revoke the license.173 Although the license holder may
be subject to immediate limitations necessary to protect the
public safety, the stewards must follow certain procedures before
suspending the horseman's license. 74 If the stewards suspend the
license, the license holder is entitled to contest the suspension
before the racing commission. 75 Other jurisdictions provide sim-
ilar protection to the licensee. 76
Thus, on the face of many of the rules, although a horseman
may be ejected without procedural protection before or at the
time of the ejection (just as a patron may be),'7 if the exclusion
is permanent or involves a penalty directly affecting his license,
the rules often accord him some procedural protection before
the penalty becomes effective plus an appeal after the penalty
becomes effective.
Some jurisdictions, such as Kentucky, have effectively codi-
fied the common law right of absolute exclusion, thereby per-
mitting the racetrack to expel or exclude a licensee for any reason
whatsoever, or for no reason at all. 78 Some states' exclusion
statutes and regulations, however, limit the authority to expel a
horseman granted to racetracks, requiring the racetrack to find
that the horseman falls within an excludable category. 7 9
Daly v. Commonwealth Horse Racing Comm'n,10 for ex-
ample, involved a Pennsylvania exclusion statute that, among
other things, allowed the racetrack to exclude a licensed person
whose presence was "detrimental to the best interests of horse
racing."' 8 1 Daly was a jockey whom a New Jersey grand jury
had indicted on race fixing charges. On this basis, the Keystone
Id. at R. 693-9.177(99D)(2).
" Id. at R. 693-4.3(99D)(2) (stewards must investigate the alleged misconduct); id.
at R. 693-4.3(99D)(3) (stewards must give the license holder adequate notice of the
steward's meeting).
"I Id. at R. 693-4.7(99D)(3).
116 See, e.g., NEBRASKA RULES OF RACING, Ch. 7.001 (1984) (a licensee penalized or
disciplined under these rules may request a hearing before the racing commission).
" See notes 108-13 supra and accompanying text.
"3 See KENTUCKY RULES OF RACING, R. VI, § 23 (1984). See also James v. Churchill
Downs, Inc., 620 S.W.2d 323 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
I" See notes 104-07 supra for the rules of various jurisdictions that set forth a
standard for exclusion.
"- 391 A.2d 1134 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978).
"3 Id. at 1135.
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Race Track-pursuant to the exclusion statute-excluded Daly
from its grounds. The plaintiff argued that the statute was
"impermissibly vague," in violation of his constitutional rights.In
The court disagreed, finding that the exclusion statute reflected
the legislature's intent "to maintain public respect and confi-
dence in the sport of horse racing" and that, therefore, it was
sufficient that the conduct precipitating the exclusion "reflected]
negatively on the sport."'' 83 According to the court, the statute
was not vague because "a person of ordinary intelligence is
capable of determining what conduct the statute encompas-
ses.91 84
Arkansas has also upheld a state statute phrased in a simi-
larly broad manner. 85 Certain statutes, in addition to providing
a standard for permissive exclusion, also place an affirmative
duty on the racetrack to exclude certain categories of licensees. 8 6
If the statute or regulation articulates a sufficiently definite
standard, the licensee will still probably challenge the exclusion
on due process grounds. To invoke the due process clause,
however, the licensee must establish at least two threshold re-
quirements: first, that the exclusion deprived him of a consti-
tutionally protected interest, and second, that the exclusion
constituted state action. 8 7
The horseman usually claims that his license constitutes a
property interest protected by the fourteenth amendment. In
Phillips v. Graham,8 8 one of the most prominent cases in this
area,8 9 the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that there can be
''no question that the license of the plaintiffs to pursue an
occupation, as a trainer, owner and driver of harness horses,
[was] a property interest given protection by the due process
M'2 Id. at 1136.
1"3 Id.
I" Id.
"' See Evans v. Arkansas Racing Comm'n, 606 S.W.2d 578 (Ark. 1980). See also
Mules v. Maryland Racing Comm'n, 353 A.2d 664 (Md. App. 1976) (Maryland Racing
Commission had right to deny a license to a veterinarian who had a previous criminal
conviction).
'1 See, e.g., Fiores v. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc., 361 P.2d 921, 922 (Cal. 1961)
(convicted bookmaker excluded from racetrack).
See, e.g., Phillips v. Graham, 427 N.E.2d 550, 553-54 (Ill. 1981).
" 427 N.E.2d 550 (Ill. 1981).
89 Cf. Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979).
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clause."'9 The management of Fairmount Park Racetrack had
excluded one of the plaintiffs, Phillips, after they learned that
he had been indicted for conspiring to bribe a harness driver
there. The Illinois Racing Board had subsequently affirmed the
racetrack's action and extended the exclusion to all racetracks
in Illinois. Phillips claimed that both actions deprived him of
his property interest in his license. Accepting this contention,
the court apparently found state action present, for it employed
a due process analysis. The court, however, ultimately deter-
mined that Phillips had received all process to which he was
entitled. 91 The Phillips court relied on the United States Supreme
Court decision in Barry v. Barchi,'92 a licensing case that is at
least arguably distinguishable.' 93 Nevertheless, other courts 94 are
in accord with Phillips, and consider the horseman's license a
constitutionally protectible property interest.
Even if a property interest is present, the excluded licensee
must still establish that the act of excluding him constituted state
action. 95 In the context of an exclusion by racetrack manage-
ment, state action frequently will not be present unless the racing
commission has directly intervened. In Evans v. Arkansas Racing
Commission, 9 the court did not find the requisite state action
when the racetrack management of Oaklawn Jockey Club, Inc.
refused to allow the plaintiff to run his horses. Because Oaklawn
was a private corporation, its private acts with respect to the
plaintiff were not the acts of the state, even though the rules
and regulations of the racing commission authorized the exclu-
sion and the commission reviewed and upheld the racetrack's
decision. 97
If the horseman excluded by racetrack management is enti-
tled to procedural due process, the only remaining issue is what
427 N.E.2d at 553.
"' Id. at 552-53, 555.
, 443 U.S. 55 (1979).
'9' In Phillips, both the racetrack and the state racing commission had taken action
to exclude the plaintiff; in Barry, only the racing commission took action.
1" See, e.g., O'Daniel v. Ohio State Racing Comm'n, 307 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio 1974).
But see Bier v. Fleming, 538 F. Supp. 437 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (liberty interest).
"' See notes 86-95 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of state action in
the equal protection context.
' 606 S.W.2d 578 (Ark. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 910 (1981).
Id. at 579, 583. But see 538 F. Supp. at 446.
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types of procedural safeguards are required. Barry v. Barchi,193
the landmark Supreme Court case dealing with procedural due
process and horsemen, involved the summary suspension of a
trainer's license by the stewards at Monticello Raceway in New
York. After one of the plaintiff's horses was found, through a
postrace urinalysis, to have been drugged, the steward ultimately
suspended the trainer's license without any presus'pension hear-
ing. The plaintiff contended that the suspension violated his due
process rights. 199 Concluding that the plaintiff was entitled to
due process, the Court focused upon the timing of the hearing
to which the plaintiff was entitled.20 0 Though the plaintiff in-
sisted that, for the hearing to be "at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner, ' 20 1 the hearing would have to be before the
suspension, the Court disagreed:
Unquestionably, the magnitude of a trainer's interest in avoid-
ing suspension is substantial; but the State also has an impor-
tant interest in assuring the integrity of the racing carried on
under its auspices. In these circumstances, it seems to us that
the State is entitled to impose an interim suspension, pending
a prompt judicial or administrative hearing that would defi-
nitely determine the issues, whenever it has satisfactorily estab-
lished probable cause to believe that a horse has been drugged
and that a trainer has been at least negligent in connection
with the drugging.202
On the facts presented, the Court found it necessary that the
plaintiff "be assured a prompt postsuspension hearing, one that
would proceed and be concluded without appreciable delay. '203
The Court's ruling, however, appeared to be limited by the
following facts. First, the plaintiff's indictment by a grand jury
demonstrated probable cause, which, in turn, provided "sub-
stantial assurance that the trainer's interest [was] not being base-
'' 443 U.S. 55 (1979).
I d. at 59, 61. For a discussion of trainer responsibility concerning race horse
drugging, see generally Garrison & Klein, Brennan Revisited: Trainer's Responsibility
for Race Horse Drugging, 70 Ky. L.J. 1103 (1981-82).
443 U.S. at 63-64.
N1 Id. at 65 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
'01 443 U.S. at 64.
'O3 Id. at 66.
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lessly compromised." 204 Second, the presuspension opportunities
that the plaintiff had to "present his side of the story to the
State's investigators . . . sufficed for the purposes of probable
cause and interim suspension. '20 5
The Barry precedent was applied to the exclusion of a horse-
man in Phillips v. Graham.2°6 The Phillips court noted that when
"only property rights are involved, mere postponement of the
judicial inquiry is not a denial of due process, if the opportunity
given for ultimate judicial determination is adequate. 20 7 Quot-
ing Barry with approval, the court accepted the notion that no
prehearing is necessary if, under the circumstances, the state's
interest in upholding the integrity of racing outweighs the licen-
see's temporary interest, if there is "substantial assurance" that
the interim action is proper, and if a prompt postsuspension
hearing is afforded to finally resolve the issues. 20 8 The Phillips
court found that both the racetrack and the racing board had
just cause to exclude the plaintiff, that "the procedure estab-
lished by the Racing Board to determine promptly the propriety
of an exclusion order issued by [a racetrack] significantly re-
duce[d] the 'risk of erroneous deprivation,' " and that the licen-
see was entitled to a de novo hearing before the Board within
seven to twelve days after his receipt of the exclusion order. 209
The court, therefore, concluded that the plaintiff had received
procedural due process and that his exclusion, both by the
racetrack and by the state racing board, was proper. 210
Most statutory and regulatory exclusion rules, if implemented
properly by the racetrack, can be applied in a constitutional
manner so long as there is a rational justification for the exclu-
sion that outweighs the licensee's need to be at the racetrack.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that in both Phillips and Barry, the
state racing commission was actively involved, so that the pres-
ence of state action was clear. In the absence of such involve-
- Id. at 65.
Id. at 65-66 (emphasis added).
- 427 N.E.2d 550 (Il1. 1981).
-° Id. at 553 (quoting Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 611 (1974)).
- 427 N.E.2d at 556.
Id. at 555-56 (emphasis added).
210 Id.
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ment, the licensee will have great difficulty establishing state
action, and the requirements imposed by the due process clause
may not even be applicable.
If the state racing commission is involved in the exclusion,
the substantive standards imposed by the commission rules must
also pass constitutional muster. The standards governing com-
mission action regarding exclusion are likely to be identical to
those governing statutory and regulatory exclusion by the race-
track. 21' As discussed above, those statutes and regulations that
set forth specific criteria for exclusion, such as rule violations212
or other types of enumerated misconduct,2 1 3 are much more
likely to be upheld when applied to any given horseman. 21 4
On the procedural side of the analysis, Barry and Phillips
suggest that, although a hearing before the racing commission
excludes a horseman may not always be required, a prompt
postexclusion hearing is a constitutional necessity. 2 5 If the racing
commission seeks to revoke or suspend the horseman's license216
in lieu of, or in addition to, excluding him from one or more
racetracks pursuant to the exclusion provision, 2 7 then the re-
quired procedural safeguards must be applied a fortiori.2 8 If,
under state law, the racing commission has an opportunity to
employ either an immediate exclusion or license suspension with-
out a hearing, 219 or a more constitutionally acceptable prehearing
or prompt posthearing, 220 the racing commission would be well
advised to employ one of the latter alternatives. Moreover, states
'" See, e.g., KRS § 230.215 (1982); KENTUCKY RULES OF RACING, R. VI, § 23
(1984).
2,2 See notes 147-57 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of exclusion rules
that are triggered by rule violations.
"I3 See notes 158-62 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of exclusion rules
that are triggered by enumerated misconduct.
2,4 See, e.g., Daly v. Commonwealth Horse Racing Comm'n, 391 A.2d 1134 (Pa.
1978).
"I See 427 N.E.2d at 555-56.
216 See, e.g., 443 U.S. at 59.
217 See, e.g., 427 N.E.2d at 552.
2a In the licensing context, both the state action and the deprivation of a property
interest are clear. If the horseman is merely excluded from the premises, however, both
arguments become more tenuous.
219 See KRS §§ 230.215(2), KRS 230.260(l) (1982).
22 See id. § 230.320 (1982).
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lacking the requisite standards and procedural safeguards for
racing commission action involving both the exclusion and the
license revocation scenarios would be well-advised to enact them.
CONCLUSION
The existence of a racetrack's common law right to exclude
both patrons and horsemen is well established in American jur-
isprudence. The majority of the courts have concluded that a
racetrack must have the right to choose its patrons and, with
some limitation, the right to restrict those who desire to work
on the racetrack's premises. In almost all situations constitu-
tional challenges have failed because the courts have generally
not found requisite state action. In most situations, the racetrack
as a private enterprise has not been required to afford the litigant
the sought-after constitutional rights.
Enhancing this common law right, statutes and regulations
have specifically given the racetrack and the various racing com-
missions exclusionary authority. But it is through these statutes
and regulations that the courts in some situations have found
that procedural due process considerations are present and must
be observed. This is especially true when the action complained
of directly involves the applicable racing commission. Neverthe-
less, even if potential due process problems arise, available pro-
cedures will often make it possible for the racetrack, the racing
commission, or both to implement the exclusion in a constitu-
tionally permissible manner.
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